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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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Arms Control

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JAPAN

Diet Stalls Over U.S. Port Call Controversy

52600032 Tokyo KYODO in English
0334 GMT 2 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, 2 Feb (KYODO)—Opposition lawmakers halted a Budget Committee session of the House of the Representatives Tuesday morning in protest at a reply by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita to a question about port calls in Japan by U.S. warships.

Questioner Tsuruo Yamaguchi, secretary general of the top opposition Japan Socialist Party, said it is natural for Japan, which maintains three nonnuclear principles, to propose prior consultations with the United States to inspect U.S. warships which are suspected of carrying nuclear weapons when they make port calls at Japanese ports.

Takeshita rejected Yamaguchi's call and said it is the U.S. Government, not the Japanese Government, which has the right to propose prior consultations with Japan, as laid down in notes on a bilateral treaty.

The notes exchanged between the two sides say major changes in the deployment into Japan of U.S. forces and in their equipment and the use of facilities in Japan as bases for military combat operations shall be the subject of prior consultation with the Japanese Government.

Takeshita said the government does not assume that Japan should propose prior consultations with the United States because such action would infer an assumption that the U.S. was not abiding by the agreement.

Yamaguchi refused to continue his interpellation due to dissatisfaction with Takeshita's answer.

The ruling and opposition parties are negotiating to resume the session. The interruption, which began half an hour after the session opened, followed a similar boycott Monday which occurred when opposition members walked out in protest at committee Chairman Koichi Hamada's handling of business.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Removal of Soviet Missiles Initiated

Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles To Begin 25 Feb
08242113 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
2042 GMT 24 Feb 88

[Text] Following an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments, the withdrawal of Soviet Army missile units equipped with operational-tactical missiles from Czechoslovak territory will begin tomorrow. This was stated today by Dusan Rovensky, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He stated that the only base for Soviet shorter-range missiles in Czechoslovakia equipped with the OTR-22 missiles is located in the military zone near the town of Hranice na Morave. This is an important act, a sign of good will, and a constructive example that further strengthens the process of improving the international atmosphere, which has been markedly and positively influenced by the results of the summit between the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington, above all by the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

It is new and convincing proof that the Soviet Union is consistently and honorably fulfilling its obligations, and fulfilling them ahead of schedule. It is a sign of the enterprising and constructive peace policy of the socialist countries.

Dusan Rovensky went on to emphasize that in the spirit of the foreign policy line set out by the 17th party congress, we will take part in the joint efforts of the fraternal countries to ensure a peaceful and secure world.

The OTR-22 operational tactical missiles were deployed on Czechoslovak territory in the interests of our security and in the interests of the security of our allies, as a response to the deployment of U.S. Pershing-2 first-strike missiles and cruise missiles in some West European countries.

The missiles and launch equipment are now being transported to areas in the Soviet Union, where they are expected to be eliminated following the ratification of the treaty.

In this situation in which there is a realistic hope that this treaty will enter into force as early as in the first half of this year, the Soviet missiles can be withdrawn without any threat to Czechoslovakia's security. Czechoslovakia is thus once again becoming a country free of nuclear weapons, stated the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Now it is important that the ratification process of the treaty proceed successfully in the U.S. Senate, and that measures be put in hand for its prompt implementation. The disarmament process must continue, with emphasis on the aspect which is the most important at the present time—that is, the reduction of strategic offensive weapons by 50-percent while strictly adhering to the ABM treaty on the basis of the formulation contained in the joint declaration of the Soviet Union and the United States dated 10 December last year.

Also important is the solution of such important issues as a chemical weapons ban and the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons arsenals. Dusan Rovensky stressed.

Removal Begins in Moravia
08250720 Prague CTK in English 0659 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] Prague Feb 25 (CTK)—Preparations for the withdrawal of Soviet shorter-range missiles were launched in Hranice na Morave (north Moravia) early today.

The hardware was transported from military facilities to a railway station where it was being entrained. The action is watched by a group of more than 60 journalists. A news conference with soldiers and officers of the Soviet missile unit will take place on the barracks premises.

The first transport will leave the town this evening.

The withdrawal of the missiles already before the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty is another proof of sincerity, concrete and constructive character of the Soviet approach to nuclear disarmament and creation of a more secure world.

Further on Soviet Missile Withdrawal

Preparing Missiles for Removal
08251512 Prague CTK in English 1355 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] Prague Feb 25 (CTK)—Members of a Soviet missile unit started preparing the withdrawal of operational tactical missiles by entraining hardware at the railway station in Hranice na Morave, North Moravia, today.

The commander of the unit, Colonel Vyacheslav Granovskiy, told CTK that the preparations were taking place as planned and the first transport of hardware and teams—officers, mechanics and drivers—will set out for sites in the Soviet Union tonight.

Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Spokesman Dusan Rovensky said last night that the OTR-22 missiles are to be liquidated in the Soviet Union after the Soviet-U.S. treaty to scrap medium- and shorter-range missiles is ratified.

Over 70 Czechoslovak and Soviet journalists and radio and television teams watched Soviet soldiers entraining 19 mobile launchers. The operation continued without a hitch despite heavy snowfall. Every 20-30 minutes one launcher was carefully fixed with many safety steps taken.

The driver of the last launcher to be entrained told CTK that "we were told about the missiles withdrawal about three weeks ago and have prepared the operation meticulously. I shall have pleasant memories of my service in Hranice na Morave."

Later today, Colonel Vyacheslav Granovskiy, commander of the missile unit, told journalists about the further steps to be taken and when the missiles and warheads will be removed.

"Thirty nine Soviet operational tactical missiles with a range of 500-1000 kilometres and 24 mobile launchers were sited in Czechoslovakia in response to the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles of the Pershing-2 type. In today's first stage we are withdrawing 19 mobile launchers. We shall end the transport of missiles and all equipment to the liquidation site about the middle of March."

As regards safe transport on Czechoslovak territory, "we have adopted, in cooperation with Czechoslovak bodies, all essential measures to guarantee absolute safety of the transport."

Asked what would be done with the operational tactical missiles and other equipment if the Soviet-U.S. treaty is not ratified, Colonel Granovskiy said that "for the time being, the launchers and missiles are only transported to liquidation sites to stay there until the moment of ratification. If the treaty is not ratified, further steps will be decided by competent bodies."

Answering a question whether it was not premature to withdraw the missiles, he said that "American inspectors will have an opportunity to come to the military premises near Hranice na Morave and see for themselves that the missiles are not there. Under the text of the treaty, Czechoslovak bodies are obliged to grant them visas within 24 hours and create all conditions they need for their activity, after the treaty is ratified, naturally."

He said his unit was leaving Czechoslovakia with the good feeling that it has fulfilled its tasks.

A meeting was held on the premises of the Soviet missile unit in Hranice na Morava today on the occasion of the departure of the first transport to the Soviet Union.

The unit's commander Colonel Vyacheslav Granovskiy stressed on this occasion that the withdrawal of Soviet missiles is an expression of the Soviet peace initiative and veracity of the approach to the elimination of the nuclear threat.

The meeting, attended by leading representatives of the Central Group of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia and representatives of the Czechoslovak People's Army Command, reflected friendship and fraternal cooperation between the Soviet and Czechoslovak Armies and people.

Later on the unit left the barracks and got on a prepared train. At 16.53 (15.53 GMT) sharp, the train left the town for the Soviet Union.

The withdrawal of the Soviet operational tactical missiles from the Hranice na Morava military district will continue, and according to Soviet commanders, will be completed in about mid-March 1988.

Missiles Loaded Onto Trains

08252142 Prague Television Service in Czech
1830 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Video report by unidentified correspondents from Hranice na Morave]

[Text] The train station at Hranice na Morave received an unexpected present in the form of snow overnight. So far this has not complicated the work of the railmen in any way. All trains have been dispatched on time since this morning, but attention will focus primarily on a special transport, whose departure has been set for 17.58.

We are watching the assembly of the first military transports that gradually will take home to the Soviet Union the unit manning the SS-12 missiles that has ended its activity in Czechoslovakia.

This is in effect a kind of a prologue, a picture of what is to come, the first step out of the whole of that enormous movement, which, after the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, will then begin on both sides the implementation of the provisions concerning other nuclear missile systems deployed on the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States, the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Czechoslovakia is one of the nine countries to which the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty apply. We are witnessing here an event, which as an act of good will and as formulated by Soviet representatives, is already taking place in our country and at the same time in the GDR today even before the Soviet-U.S. treaty has been ratified and, for this reason, today without the presence of U.S. inspectors. The first transport is taking away the mobile parts of the OTR-22 systems, codenamed also the SS-12 system. Other transports will take back to the Soviet Union gradually and separately other parts and nuclear warheads.

[Begin recording in Russian fading into Czech translation] [Unidentified questioner] What have you done to ensure the safety of the transport?

[Unidentified speaker] The safety of the transport is fully ensured. The equipment has been fastened and secured exactly in accordance with our strict regulations, and for this reason there is no danger to the safety of Czechoslovak rail traffic or inhabitants.

[Questioner] What will be the fate of your cargo following arrival in the Soviet Union?

[Speaker] In line with the agreement reached in Washington, as you surely know, whole missile systems will be taken to a place for their liquidation. Special parts will be destroyed and vehicles, engines, and some other parts will be used in the national economy. [end recording]

A total of 55 journalists and photographers were curious to witness the departure of the missiles. They were brought from Prague by special bus. We were allowed to enter as far as the platform. The missiles were loaded at a distant track, several hundreds of meters from the train station itself. Despite this they did not escape the attention of passengers, and so we were able to record on Platform 2 the following voices:

[Begin recording] [Passenger] It's a good thing that these missiles are being moved away from here. It looks as if the international situation will be really better.

[Second passenger] I am glad that it has at last happened, that it has come to this here. Now it only depends on whether the treaty will be ratified, and we have to believe that it will.

[Third passenger] This is giving me peace because I am saying to myself that this will be better for life in peace. [end recording]

It's 0901 and the first heavy transporters with their SS-12 missile cargo are beginning to move. And along with them a garrison, a unit of the missile troops is returning to the Soviet Union. These men arrived in our country in 1983 as a response to the deployment of the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles in West Europe. The seriously meant peaceful steps taken by world's great powers are today enabling them to return home.

[Begin unidentified political officer in Russian fading into Czech translation] I truly liked serving in Czechoslovakia, but I can say as a political officer of the unit that I have been looking forward a great deal to these moments linked with the elimination of the missiles. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our friends for having created good conditions for our service and life in Czechoslovakia. [end recording]

[Announcer] In the afternoon before the train set off a meeting of Soviet troops with representatives of our Army, representatives and citizens of the town of Hranice and the district of Prerov took place in the compounds of the barracks housing the Soviet unit.

Further Report

08261127 Prague International Service in Czech
2230 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] The withdrawal of the Soviet shorter-range missiles from Czechoslovak territory has started in Hranice na Morave today. Our special correspondent Frantisek Vonderka telephoned this report:

[Vonderka] It is precisely 2015 and I am able to watch at this railway station the loading of the military technology of the Soviet brigade which has at its disposal OTR-22 medium-range missiles. They are known in the West as the SS-12. These missiles will be transported from their launching position near Hranice na Morave to a designated place in the Soviet Union where they will be destroyed after the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the so-called double-zero option. The withdrawal of the OTR-22 missiles from Czechoslovak territory even before this treaty is ratified is being carried out on the basis of an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments. This demonstration of good will which I am able to watch with my own eyes is to contribute to the strengthening of confidence in the process of nuclear disarmament which our planet so urgently needs in the interest of its survival.

The first train is leaving for the Soviet Union from Hranice na Morave with the armaments and soldiers from the Soviet missile brigade. Their complete withdrawal from Czechoslovak territory is to be concluded by the end of March this year.

The withdrawal of the OTR-22 missiles from Czechoslovakia is a specific demonstration of the interest of the Warsaw Pact states in nuclear disarmament and in disarmament as a whole. It is now up to the North Atlantic alliance countries to behave in a similar way. They do have opportunities to do so.

[Announcer] This is how Frantisek Vonderka, special Radio Prague correspondent, commented on the beginning of the withdrawal of the Soviet operative-tactical missiles from Czechoslovakia.

Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Granovskiy, commander of the missile unit, told to a CTK reporter that the first load with military technology and its service staff—the officers, mechanics, and drivers—set off tonight for the designated places in the Soviet Union.

Colonel General Jan Kryzhan, commander of the Czechoslovak missile troops and artillery, said at the press conference that the Soviet base in Hranice na Morava was the only place of deployment [rozmístění] of the shorter-range operative-tactical missiles. There are no other shorter-and medium-range missiles in Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak People's Army does not have any nuclear weapons in its arsenal, Jan Kryzhan said.

Withdrawal Assessed

08252329 Prague International Service in English
1900 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] Despite the fact that the Soviet-American INF treaty still remains to be ratified, the Soviet Union has begun withdrawing its shorter-range nuclear missiles from the territories of Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Radio Prague's Radek Wanke comments on the significance of this step:

The Soviet Union has begun the withdrawal of its shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed in Czechoslovakia and the GDR under an agreement with the governments of the two countries, despite the fact that the INF treaty has yet to be ratified by the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Soviet. In other words, this is another goodwill gesture on the part of the Soviet Union in improving relations and building up trust between the East and West.

Let us recall why the Soviet shorter-range nuclear missiles were deployed on the territories of the GDR and Czechoslovakia in the first place. This was done to counterbalance the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. It was a necessary step, because after the Soviet Union had failed to convince the NATO countries of the need to negotiate an agreement about medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, which would be acceptable to both sides [words indistinct] security threatened. The withdrawal of the Soviet shorter-range missiles from Czechoslovakia and the GDR will again upset the balance of forces in Europe. Nevertheless, at the session of the Warsaw Pact countries held in May 1987 in Berlin, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and the Soviet Union agreed to take this step in order to boost the disarmament process in Europe.

This step is being taken at the time when there is good reason to believe that the INF treaty will be ratified before the first half of the year is over, says the proclamation issued by the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry. This step will make Czechoslovakia again a nuclear-free country, said the general secretary of the CPCZ Milos Jakes in his address to the Czechoslovak people on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the victory of socialism in Czechoslovakia, a nuclear free country in a heavily militarized area. We believe that peace and security should not be achieved solely by a reliable defense system. Our priority goal is trust and good neighborly relations in our European common home. That is why, Milos Jakes said, we have a proposal to create a zone with a reduced military confrontation in Europe. Such a step would be in line with proposals for a nuclear-free zone in Europe and would result in closer cooperation among the European countries in other than the military field. We therefore propose a meeting at which all the European countries could discuss the possibility of cooperation of this kind and perhaps come up with their own counterproposals.

Early Western Withdrawal Urged

08260918 Prague CTK in English 0745 GMT 26 Feb 88

[Text] Prague Feb 26 (CTK)—The West's response to the Soviet act of good will, the withdrawal of OTR 22 missiles from Czechoslovakia before the relevant treaty is ratified, should be similar, RUDE PRAVO said today.

Ever stronger appeals are made in the FRG for an early liquidation of the 72 Pershing 1A missiles which are owned by the Bundeswehr and to which the United States has nuclear warheads, the paper said and added: "The Central European states would not be the only ones to welcome this, as the present time requires everybody to do everything for the nuclear danger threatening mankind to disappear before the end of this century."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Western Opponents of Disarmament Criticized

02251841 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 23 Feb 88 p 2

["He" commentary: "Pinpointed Attacks"]

[Text] The first steps have been taken in the struggle against the nuclear threat. The USSR has reaffirmed that it considers the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Shorter and Intermediate-Range Missiles to be the introduction to real disarmament, and that it is doing everything for this process to be continued. The GDR has launched an appeal for an "international meeting for nuclear-free zones."

The FRG Government stated that it wants further disarmament steps after the Washington treaty, and that in its view there is no need to modernize tactical nuclear weapons. In Moscow the USSR and U.S. foreign ministers conducted talks to prepare for the next summit meeting between the two states. One of the focal points was the drafting of an agreement for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

It was particularly at this time that outspoken opponents of disarmament made it public that all this was already too much for them. In the magazine EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE, well-known for such discord and supported by reactionary politicians, arms industry circles, and high NATO officials, the "disastrous consequences" of disarmament are deplored. Truth is unhesitatingly distorted: "In political terms the implementation of the INF treaty means an increase in the risk of a war limited to Europe an extent such as has never existed since World War II." Again the much-hackneyed lie about the threat is used as an argument: "The double-zero option leads to a situation where blackmail is possible. This agreement does not serve German and European security." The conclusion is: One cannot only "express wishes regarding arms control, but also demands regarding the development of armament."

This is where NATO Commander in Chief General Galvin comes in. He plainly expresses his view on the development of armament: "Not only should weapons be modernized, but the number of short-range nuclear weapons (missiles and artillery) should also be increased." Modernization "of all nuclear weapons of all ranges (!) and in the conventional sphere" is necessary.

Particularly at this time, when progress in the spirit of reason and realism has become discernible, the opponents are launching heavy attacks. This is a signal that further disarmament steps can only be taken against the resistance of those who still dream of military superiority and work out scenarios for a new war. It is to be hoped that those entrusted with political responsibility in the West do not allow themselves to be influenced by the opponents of disarmament. After all, it is not a question of increasing security by entering into an arms race against each other, but of achieving security by working together, by eliminating the weapons of mass destruction.

USSR To Begin Missile Withdrawal 25 Feb

08240812 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0300 GMT 24 Feb 88

[Text] Berlin, 24 Feb (ADN)—The announced early withdrawal of shorter-range Soviet missiles from the territory of the GDR will begin tomorrow in Waren, on the Mueritz, and Bischofswerda. The Foreign Ministry, spokesman Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, stated this to ADN.

This step once more testifies to the constructive peace policy of the USSR, the GDR, and the other socialist states. It is a further specific contribution to the ratification soon of the historic Soviet-U.S. treaty of 8 December 1987, and is intended to create favorable conditions for its fulfillment.

The withdrawal of these systems at such an early juncture, agreed with the USSR, [as received] at the same time aimed at raising trust between East and West and stimulating further positive changes principally on the continent of Europe. The expectation bound up with this actions is that on the other side too steps will be taken to promote a rapid coming into force of the treaty.

As Ambassador Meyer stressed, the GDR, together with the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states, is acting in accordance with the basic principle that no let-up should now be allowed in the disarmament process. In accordance with this basic concern Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, suggested in his letter to FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 16 December 1987, a series of concrete proposals, the fulfillment of which would be of far-reaching importance in supporting the disarmament process.

USSR Missile Pullout Timetable Reported

Farewell Rallies for Missile Troops Planned

08241745 Hamburg DPA in German
1617 GMT 24 Feb 88

[Text] East Berlin (DPA)—There will be farewell rallies for the Soviet missile troop units in Bischofswerda and Waren, according to the timetables given to correspondents in East Berlin, the special trains with Soviet Army personnel, their families, and the "missiles and equipment belonging to them" will depart tomorrow from Bischofswerda at 1000 and from Waren at 1600. There will also be military concerts outside the railway stations.

Soviet Troops Begin Departing

08250919 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0847 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] Dresden, 25 Feb (ADN)—At the moment, Soviet troops are being given a warm send-off at a meeting of the inhabitants of the town of Bischofswerda. They are part of those troop divisions whose shorter-range INF are being withdrawn from the GDR earlier than originally planned. During this meeting there were friendly meetings among working people, FDJ members, pioneers, and members of the Soviet Army.

The military transport loaded with the missile technology is standing at the station of the district [kreis] town in the southeastern GDR, ready to depart for the Soviet Union. Immediately after the meeting, missile troops will start their journey home on it.

This afternoon, citizens of the town and the Mecklenburg district [kreis] will see off a Soviet missile troop division in Waren an der Mueritz (Neubrandenburg Area).

Withdrawal of SS-12s 'Has Begun'

08251000 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 0900 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] The early removal of Soviet shorter-range missiles from the GDR has begun. This morning a meeting took place in Bischofswerda at which members of the Soviet missile division based there were given a warm send-off. A hundred foreign journalists covered the ceremony. Present were Hans Modrow, first secretary of the SED Dresden area Executive, and Major General (Kazachenko), deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

At the meeting it was once more recalled that the deployment of the missiles 4 years ago was necessary because of NATO's decision to deploy U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe. In the meantime the situation had changed radically. The Washington treaty of December 1987 laid down the destruction of a whole category of missiles. The commander of the Soviet troop division in Bischofswerda made it clear that the decision

to start the withdrawal before the ratification of the treaty is a gesture of good will. It confirms how seriously we take the agreement. Nonetheless there is no reason to twiddle one's thumbs.

This afternoon the withdrawal of the missiles of type OTR-22, also known as SS-12, and the component launchers and auxiliary equipment to the Soviet Union will begin in Waren an der Mueritz. The transportation of Soviet missiles from the CSSR began this morning. The first group is to leave the deployment area of Hranice na Morave this evening.

Further Coverage of Soviet Missile Withdrawal

Withdrawal Begins Ahead-of-Schedule

022520Z East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 24 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] East Berlin (ADN)—The announced ahead-of-schedule withdrawal of Soviet shorter-range missiles from the GDR will begin tomorrow in the areas of Waren on the Mueritz and Bischofswerda. This was announced by Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a conversation with ADN. This move is the latest evidence of the constructive peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the other socialist states. It is another specific contribution to the earliest ratification of the historic Soviet-U.S. treaty of 8 December 1987, and it should create favorable conditions for its implementation. The withdrawal of these systems at such an early date, which has been agreed with the USSR, is also directed at strengthening East-West trust and stimulating further positive changes, above all on the European Continent. It is expected in connection with this move that the other side will also take steps to facilitate the speedy implementation of the treaty, said Ambassador Meyer.

Ambassador Meyer stressed that the GDR is acting together with the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact member states according to the principle. No delay must now be permitted in the process of disarmament. In keeping with this position, in a letter to Helmut Kohl on 16 December 1987, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, made a number of specific proposals, the implementation of which would be of far-reaching significance to supporting the process of disarmament.

Soviet Troops Leave Waren

082517Z East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1518 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] Neubrandenburg, 25 Feb (ADN)—Members of a Soviet missile troop unit were seen off this afternoon from the GDR outside Waren station in Neubrandenburg Bezirk. At a rally citizens thanked the Soviet comrades in arms for fulfilling their internationalist duty.

The first secretary of the SED Kreis Executive, a forewoman from the Waren diesel engine works, and the commander of the missile troops unit paid tribute in their brief speeches to the early removal of the missile soldiers and their arms as a significant step toward nuclear disarmament.

The children of Soviet military families received souvenirs from Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED and chairman of the GDR Council of State.

Further Report

08252104 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1726 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Neubrandenburg, 25 Feb ADN—With militant workers' and soldiers' songs played by bands of the National People's Army (NVA) and the Soviet Army, the farewell rally for the Soviet missile troops began this afternoon outside the railway station in Waren (Mueritz) (GDR Neubrandenburg area). Taking part were workers of the Diesel engine and the corrugated paper works, the Forsttechnik combine, the food industry, agricultural enterprises and establishments, and institutes of the district. On banners with the inscriptions "For a World Without Nuclear Weapons—From Zero Option to Zero Option," "The Motive For Our Actions Is My Workplace Is My Battle Station for Peace," and "Thank You Soviet Soldiers" They expressed their commitment to the socialist policy of peace and to friendship with the Soviet Union.

Their cordial greetings were addressed to the members of the missile troops unit, who are now being withdrawn to the Soviet Union. Families of NVA members handed momentos from Erich Honecker that were accompanied by a personal greeting from the general secretary of the SED Central Committee to children of Soviet soldiers' families. "With this I express the thanks of the working people of the GDR to your parents, who have fulfilled their internationalist task for the protection of peace on the territory of the socialist German state in exemplary fashion," the message said.

Taking part in the farewell ceremony were Johannes Chemnitzer, first secretary of the Neubrandenburg SED Area Executive; Heinz Simkowski, chairman of the area council; and Colonel-General Nikolay Moseyev, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Dr Martin Brummund, chairman of the district committee of the National Front, welcomed the Soviet soldiers, sergeants, and officers.

Bernd Philipp, first secretary of the Waren SED District executive, said: "An historic event unites us at this moment. In the station stands a train ready to take you, dear Soviet friends, to your homeland. We can imagine the joy that fills you." At the hour of departure he recalled the deployment of the Soviet type OTR-22 missiles in Warenhof 4 years ago. "It was the response to

NATO's new medium-range weapons in Western Europe. This response was essential for the safeguarding of peace and the protection of the achievements of our socialist community." At the same time came the assurance: "Fight for peace, now more than ever."

He said the preservation of peace and its protection as the most precious thing is the most urgent present task. Innumerable initiatives have been taken for this since the first decree on peace by the Soviet power. "There are no people on earth that have sacrificed as much and done as much for the defense and safeguarding of peace as the people of the Soviet Union," he said. The Washington summit cleared the way for the first joint agreement on the liquidation of the medium- and shorter-range INF missiles in Europe. "What began to emerge in Reykjavik and what was signed in Washington is now becoming reality. The Soviet Union is withdrawing the medium-range missiles stationed on our territory even before the treaty has been ratified," Bernd Philipp said.

We thank you today for your service to peace, he said. Here we reaffirm what Ernst Thaelmann wrote in the visitors' book of the cruiser "Aurora" during his visit to Leningrad: "We swear to you, red sailors and revolutionary workers, that we will always go along together with the Soviet Union." [passage omitted]

Colonel Viktor Kuzmin, the 44-year-old commanding officer of the missile troops unit, emphasized in his speech that his soldiers and officers fulfilled with honor and dignity their internationalist duty vis-a-vis the allies in the protection of peace and socialism. He praised the close contacts with workers and NVA collectives and with the local party and state bodies. "Today we say a hearty thank-you to all German comrades and friends for the good cooperation, mutual understanding, and their constant support for the military tasks."

The present "Week of Brotherhood-in-Arms" contributes to the further consolidation of the friendship and understanding between the two fraternal countries, peoples, and armies. The members of the troop unit will continue, Colonel Muzmin said, to reliably and vigilantly fulfill their patriotic and internationalist duty together with the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact.

FDJ members and young NVA soldiers then handed the soldiers, sergeants, officer cadets, and officers of the Soviet army souvenirs and presents.

The rally ended to the sound of the 'Internationale.' The Soviet missile troops then boarded the waiting train. At 1600 exactly, Reichsbahn Chief Secretary Regina Stelter gave the signal for departure.

POLAND

Col Pytko on Vienna CSCE Talks

08182330 Warsaw PAP in English
2151 GMT 18 Feb 88

[By PAP correspondent Franciszek Malinowski]

[Text] Vienna, Feb. 18—During the 35-nation CSCE review meeting in Vienna, the group for military aspects of security continued its talks on the working out of the mandate of a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

During the group's work, representatives of Warsaw Treaty states prepared regular information on the ongoing consultations of 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty states.

Today, such information was presented by member of the Polish delegation, Colonel Leon Pytko who said that during consultations, representatives of the 23 states continued discussion on zones in which to apply decisions on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

Pytko said that delegations of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria have presented additional arguments and explanations on the geostrategic conditions which should be taken into consideration while discussing the zone in the Soviet Union and Turkey. The Polish envoy also said that a certain rapprochement of both sides' stands is being observed on the question of control and exchange of information.

Mandate for Future Conventional-Arms Talks Discussed in Vienna

08221744 Warsaw PAP in English
1722 GMT 22 Feb 88

[By PAP correspondent Franciszek Malinowski]

[Text] Vienna, Feb. 22—The 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states started another round of consultations here Monday with a view to discussing the mandate of future negotiations on reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and on consolidated security and stability in the whole of Europe.

The socialist countries postulated that future negotiations should be based on the principles of equal rights, balance and reciprocity, and of equal respect for security interests of all sides concerned.

Journal Reviews Disarmament Process 1 June-31 August 1987

18160002: Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOShENIYA (Russian No. 10, Oct 87 (signed to press 15 Sep 87) pp 103-120)

[International review: "Current Problems of World Politics"]

[Excerpts]

2. For a Secure World, for Civilized Relations

The tasks of perestroika and an acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development are also determining the main directions of foreign policy. Its main goal is securing for the Soviet people the opportunity to live under conditions of peace and security.

The USSR's foreign policy is based on the principles of the new political thinking. It proceeds from scientific evaluations of the actual state of affairs in the world, primarily from the profound social and political shifts and changes which have occurred since the war, combined with the unprecedented upsurge of S&T progress. As M.S. Gorbachev observed in his replies to questions from the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka*, the Soviet Union takes account in its policy primarily of the threat to human civilization in connection with the enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This is a reality which has to be faced. In addition, the correct evaluation of this reality leads to the conclusion that problems of world politics cannot today be solved militarily. Such a path would be fraught with unpredictable consequences. Consequently, an adjustment in views of the world and states' policy is necessary.

The new political thinking has its roots in the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory. K. Marx's philosophical proposition that "the coexistence of two mutually contradictory sides, their struggle and their fusion in a new category constitute the essence of dialectical movement" may with every justification be applied to contemporary East-West relations. Indeed, historical development has brought mankind to a period wherein the agenda of international life incorporates problems of the formation of a diverse, integral world with a new essence unparalleled in the past. And this essence is the fact that a world community of states united by a number of similar and common interests affecting all aspects of material production and people's spiritual life is being formed. The most important of them—the first, but not the sole one—is averting a nuclear catastrophe. Such interests are above any differences, contradictions and class antagonisms even for they concern the very basis of all that exists on Earth—the problem of the preservation of mankind.

The infringement of the security of other countries is under current conditions—however paradoxical this seems from the viewpoint of pre-nuclear thinking—

objectively not to the benefit of any state for it is fraught with the instability of world politics, undermines the foundations of the entire system of international security, involves states in the spiral of a fruitless and pointless "race for security" and at best leads to the restoration of the former state of relations, but at a new level—with higher power parameters.

Without downplaying the significance of national aspects and means of ensuring security, the Soviet Union proceeds in the determination of its strategic policy in this field primarily from the fact that international security has now become a category which is indivisible and united in its diversity and contradictoriness, as the modern world is indivisible, diverse and contradictory.

It was this theoretical premise which enabled the USSR to put forward a specific political program of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. The Soviet Union has shown in practice by its foreign policy activity, in the security sphere included, what the new political thinking is and is demonstrating its capacity for comprehending most complex, frequently controversial problems and seeking new, unusual solutions.

The attention of the world community has been attracted in recent months to the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. It is now that the question of whether the first practical step forward along the path of nuclear disarmament will be possible is being decided.

As a whole, the latest round of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms was marked by appreciable progress. This applies mainly to the work of the group discussing INF and operational-tactical missile problems. The sides are engaged in coordination of the specific provisions of a draft treaty.

Progress at the negotiations was possible primarily thanks to the constructive position of the USSR, which proposed this April a "double zero option" for a solution of the problem of INF and operational-tactical missiles in Europe, which also took into consideration the wishes of the American side concerning a separate solution of the INF question and the elimination of operational-tactical missiles as its supplement.

In order to shift the nuclear disarmament process from standstill the Soviet Union consented to a whole number of concessions. We did everything within our power to give this important business a practical start. E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, emphasized in his speech on 6 August at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The Soviet Union withdrew the condition concerning the nuclear forces of Britain and France and agreed to examine the INF question separately from that of strategic and space-based arms, although would have preferred to have discussed them all together. Finally, the Soviet Union accommodated the Asian countries and expressed a readiness to scrap all medium-range

missiles not only in Europe but in Asia also. Thus the question of the preservation of the 100 warheads on medium-range missiles which had been at issue at the Geneva negotiations with the Americans is removed—on condition, of course, that the United States do the same. Operational-tactical missiles will be eliminated also.

A global nature is thus imparted to the "double zero" concept. It is proposed scrapping two classes of nuclear missiles on two continents in regions of the densest military confrontation. It is no secret, E.A. Shevardnadze emphasized, that the Soviet side will in this case have to reduce a considerably larger number of missiles than the American side.

These steps of the USSR removed the main bones of contention in Geneva and lent impetus to the stalled negotiations. However, a serious new obstacle erected by the American side appeared.

Following 2 months of consultations with its allies, Washington surprisingly put forward a demand concerning the preservation in Europe of its nuclear warheads intended for the 72 West German operational-tactical Pershing 1A missiles which were part of the armory of the West German Bundeswehr. The nuclear warheads for these operational-tactical missiles belong to the United States and are controlled by the U.S. Army stationed in the FRG. A tense dispute flared up in connection with the Pershing 1A's. And not only in Geneva at the negotiations, what is more, but in Washington and Bonn also. The American press reported with reference to "informed sources" that the U.S. Administration had no intention of giving in to the Soviet demands concerning the elimination of the Pershing 1A missiles, even if this jeopardized an INF and operational-tactical missile treaty.

There was extensive discussion at the end of August in the FRG of a return letter from the U.S. secretary of state to the West German foreign minister in connection with the Pershing 1A's. G. Shultz, according to West German press reports, had assured Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher that the United States had no intention of examining the question of these missiles at the Geneva negotiations.

In this situation there arose perfectly naturally the question: with whom, then, should negotiations concerning the warheads for these operational-tactical missiles be conducted? Were West Germany pretending to the right to dispose of them, this position would be tantamount to its pretensions to the status of nuclear power. And this is denied by both the FRG and the United States.

As E.A. Shevardnadze declared in Geneva, "if the FRG has really illegally provided itself with nuclear weapons, this will cause anger and indignation throughout the world and could confront it with a political crisis." Not only the fate of an INF and operational-tactical missile

agreement but also a future nuclear nonproliferation treaty would thereby be in jeopardy. After all, it is possible to imagine a hypothetical situation in which the USSR's allies also, confronted with the threat of the preservation of operational-tactical missiles in the FRG, might raise the question of the deployment of similar weapons on their territory. Obviously, the Soviet Union also would be faced with the need to take their concern into consideration and accommodate them. Such a development of events would cancel out all hopes of deliverance from hundreds of Soviet and American nuclear warheads.

In addition, under the pretext of further modernization of the FRG's missiles the United States would have liked to have preserved production of the Pershing 1B missile "for the West Germans". It was further a question of it being possible in a matter of hours to refit the Pershing 1B operational-tactical missiles as Pershing 2 medium-range missiles, which reach targets on USSR territory. And this would essentially mean the United States' primordial intention to reserve for itself positions of superiority to the Soviet Union.

The acute debate on the missiles issue affected the ranks of the ruling coalition in the FRG also, some influential figures of which supported in this form or the other the elimination of "their" operational-tactical missiles. However, at a press conference on 26 August FRG Chancellor H. Kohl specified his country's position, declaring that, given certain conditions, the Pershing 1A missiles would not be modernized but would be scrapped. The chancellor's statement introduced a new feature to the situation at the negotiations.

The decisive stage of the INF and operational-tactical missile negotiations was the visit of E.A. Shevardnadze, foreign minister of the Soviet Union, to Washington in September. The Soviet representative held meetings and negotiations with U.S. President R. Reagan and Secretary of State G. Shultz. As a result it was possible to remove the majority of disagreements and obstacles to the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles. An understanding in principle was reached on the conclusion of the corresponding treaty, and the necessary instructions on this score were given to the delegations of the two sides in Geneva. For its signing and the examination of the entire spectrum of questions of relations between the USSR and the United States it was arranged for a meeting to be held between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in the fall of 1987. E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz also arranged to begin on 1 December 1987 full-scale bilateral negotiations on the limitation of and ultimately a complete halt to nuclear testing. One further important document was signed during the Soviet minister's visit to Washington—a Soviet-American agreement on the creation of nuclear-danger reduction centers. It was not possible, unfortunately, to bring closer the sides' positions on the question

of a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms under the conditions of strict compliance with and a strengthening of the terms of the ABM Treaty.

At the strategic arms negotiations in Geneva the American delegation continued essentially to adhere to the policy of circumventing the Reykjavik accords. It put forward a number of unacceptable demands.

In the space group the American side practically avoided serious discussion. The U.S. delegation demonstrated Washington's complete devotion to the SDI and a lack of profound interest in a strengthening of the ABM Treaty.

The American side in fact gave no real answer to the compromise proposals which had been put forward by the USSR during U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz's visit to Moscow this April: concerning a strengthening of the terms of the ABM Treaty on the basis of mutual commitments not to withdraw from it for a period of 10 years given strict compliance with all its provisions; an understanding concerning the boundary between activity permitted and prohibited by the treaty by way of the coordination of a list of devices whose guidance into space, for testing purposes included, would not be permitted; and also an accord concerning authorized research activity on Earth—in laboratories and at test ranges and manufacturer-plants, in the open air included.

While paying paramount attention to the problem of nuclear disarmament the Soviet Union is not retreating one step in its struggle for the elimination and banning of chemical weapons. Multilateral talks on this issue have been under way since the start of the 1980's within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Only in 1986 did a positive turning point therein come to light. The participants succeeded in the course of keen debate in bringing their positions closer together, although many disagreements and contentious problems remain.

Many of the questions which had earlier seemed insoluble were settled thanks to the radical proposals and actions of the Soviet Union. It, specifically, completely suspended the production of chemical weapons (other Warsaw Pact countries had never produced them and did not have such on their territory). The construction of a special enterprise for scrapping these weapons was begun. The commissioning of this enterprise will make it possible to eliminate very quickly our existing chemical weapons following the conclusion of an international convention.

The Soviet proposals at the negotiations completely repudiated the speculation in connection with the fact that we "fear" verification. We made it clearly understood that we are ready for the most dependable verification of compliance with the convention being prepared in respect of all the questions which it broaches—scrapping of stockpiles, the elimination of the enterprises

producing these weapons and the production of chemicals and medical preparations which could be used to create chemical weapons, investigation of instances of suspicion of a violation of the convention arising and so forth. A real opportunity has now appeared for the conclusion of an international convention in this connection. The new Soviet initiatives aimed at an acceleration of the negotiations on banning chemical weapons advanced by the USSR on 6 August at the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament were greeted with approval by the international community.

Specifically, to create an atmosphere of trust and guided by the interests of the speediest conclusion of a convention, the Soviet side invited the participants in the negotiations on chemical weapons to the Soviet Shikhan military facility to acquaint themselves with the standard models we have of chemical ammunition and the technology for the scrapping of chemical weapons at a mobile complex. It was declared also that some time later international experts would be invited to the special enterprise for scrapping chemical weapons which is being built in the region of the city of Chapayevsk.

The Soviet Union's enterprising international activity enjoys the approval and support of its Warsaw Pact allies. The most important and material point—and this is the guarantee of the effectiveness of socialist foreign policy—is that each Warsaw Pact state does not simply express support for the peace-loving initiatives of the USSR but makes its own contribution to the shaping of the foreign policy strategy of the socialist community.

In recent years—both under the influence of the new international conditions and as a result of the general democratization of domestic life—the socialist community countries have stepped up their peace offensive in all areas. It is sufficient to recall some of the joint initiatives providing an incomplete, but sufficient idea of the scale of their concerted international activity.

The program adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in June 1986 in Budapest which the Warsaw Pact states addressed to the NATO states and all European countries concerning a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe could be a major step toward disarmament in Europe.

An exceptional role in the fraternal countries' joint activity belongs to the document "Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States" adopted at the Political Consultative Committee meeting this May in Berlin and reflecting the strictly defensive intentions of the allied powers. Their initiatives and proposals pertaining to a lowering of the level of military confrontation, the elimination of all Soviet and American medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles, the banning of nuclear testing, the elimination of chemical weapons and a radical reduction in armed forces and conventional types of weapons, as also other measures to make Europe a continent of security and trust, are characterized by

comprehensiveness, constructiveness and realism. They are sustained entirely in a spirit of the new political thinking and the philosophy of the preservation of human civilization.

An important step forward in the strengthening of trust between East and West could be realization of the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal addressed to the NATO countries concerning consultations for the purpose of studying and comparing military doctrines and analyzing their nature and further evolution.

The group of socialist countries presented in the summer of the present year a large-scale joint initiative which was a contribution to the development of problems of nuclear disarmament. They presented for examination at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament the document "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Banning of Nuclear Weapons Testing".

As is known, guided by the interests of the creation of a nuclear-free world, the Soviet Union set an example of a sincere aspiration to the practical solution of this most complex problem by imposing on 6 August 1985 a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and calling for all states possessing such weapons to join it.

The Soviet Union's act of good will (and the moratorium was extended repeatedly right up to the start of 1987) enjoyed extensive repercussions in the world and sincere support both among the public and in political circles of various countries. Unfortunately, the United States did not join the USSR's initiative, justifying, *inter alia*, its negative attitude by a variety of references to the difficulty of effective verification. The contrived nature of the pretext is obvious. Specialists, Americans included, have spoken of this. The more so in that the Soviet Union expressed a readiness for the use of all forms of verification, including on-site inspection.

The document proposed this summer by the socialist countries synthesizes, as it were, the experience and results of work accumulated over many years on the solution of problems of nuclear testing and the new ideas and proposals which have been put forward recently by many countries, primarily the Delhi Six.

The document poses anew to a large extent the question of verification and inspection. Considering the acute lack of trust in international relations, it provides for broad-scale verification measures: from notification of the whereabouts of test ranges through the participation of international inspectors in the monitoring of the nonconducting of test explosions of nuclear weapons at these ranges. The creation of an international inspectors institution is proposed to make the monitoring more effective. It is appropriate to recall here that the tripartite reports to the Disarmament Committee made by the

Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain have not provided for such an institution. The question of an international system of seismic monitoring was further developed also.

An important place in the proposed system of verification is assigned on-site inspection. In addition to other means of such inspection, it is anticipated, *inter alia*, that a state which has received a request concerning on-site inspection will be obliged to unconditionally afford access to the site designated in this request. Naturally, time and painstaking work will be needed to coordinate the criteria and procedures of a request for inspection and verification and their realization, including a list of the rights and functions of the verifying personnel. However, it is important to consolidate the principle of the obligatory nature of verification for the parties to the treaty. This would make it possible on the one hand to lessen suspicion in relations with one another and, on the other, to erect a barrier to attempts to circumvent the treaty.

The USSR also expressed a readiness to come to an arrangement on a gradual solution of the problem of a halt to nuclear testing by way of the imposition of interim limitations on the quantity and yield of nuclear explosions. This could start with the announcement of a bilateral moratorium right now. While preferring a full moratorium, the USSR is nonetheless prepared to consider the United States' position and negotiate with it the limiting of the yield of explosions to 1 kiloton and a reduction in the number thereof to the minimum.

A reflection of the lofty humanism of Soviet foreign policy and its concern for the fate of the peoples of the world is the principle of development via disarmament organically built into the concept of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security.

Military preparations and the arms race are unproductively squandering mankind's material and intellectual potential and impeding the solution of present-day global problems which confront it, whose exacerbation entails a threat to the existence of civilization itself. World military spending amounted in 1986 to approximately \$900 billion. Some \$1.7 million was spent each minute on the arms race in the world last year, 100 million persons worked for it and it swallowed up approximately 6 percent of world GNP.

The militarization of international life is having the most disastrous consequences for the developing countries. Their share of world military spending grew from 3 percent in 1955 to 18 percent by the mid-1980's, exceeding \$150 billion in 1985. There are approximately 15 million men in the armies of the young states—60 percent of the world's servicemen. These countries have accounted in recent years for approximately 75 percent of world arms imports.

The young independent states, as the weaker side in the capitalist division of labor, account for a significant proportion of the difficulties being experienced by the capitalist economy under the influence of militarism. "It is time everyone recognized," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his address to the participants in the international conference on the interrelationship between disarmament and development, "that in leaving, wittingly or otherwise, the peoples of some regions and whole continents even in the position of exploited and destitute mankind is running the risk of causing an explosion no less disastrous than a thermonuclear encounter." Realization of the "disarmament for development" principle can and must unite mankind and help mold its planetary consciousness.

The socialist community countries consider incompatible the process of the world development and the preparation for war. This was said, specifically, in the document "Surmounting Underdevelopment and Establishing a New International Economic Order," which was adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

These and many other problems were examined at the conference on the interrelationship between disarmament and development which opened on 24 August in New York. Ignoring the interests of the countries assembled thereat, the United States declined to participate in this representative international forum.

The socialist countries arrived at the conference with specific practical proposals. From standpoints of glasnost and openness in respect of states' military activity we proposed a comparison of the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We proposed that all states draw up and submit for international discussion national conversion plans, which would attest a resolve to reduce military production.

It was observed in the speech of V.F. Petrovskiy, head of the Soviet delegation and USSR deputy foreign minister, that the attempts which had been made thus far to compare military budgets had not produced a positive result as a consequence of fundamental differences in the arms price structure and also in the pricing mechanism. The conferees were given explanations concerning our recently published defense budget (R20.2 billion). Specifically, it was stipulated that it reflected expenditure of the USSR Defense Ministry on the upkeep of the personnel of the armed forces, logistical support, military development, pensions and a number of other outlays. At the same time, however, RDT&E and also arms and military equipment purchases are financed under other items of the USSR budget. The Soviet representative pointed to the fact that upon completion of the radical pricing reform scheduled in our country there will be an opportunity for a realistic comparison of overall military spending.

In the context of the new political thinking, V.F. Petrovskiy emphasized, we pose the question thus. Disarmament is not, of course, an end in itself. We firmly advocate each arms limitation and reduction measure not only bringing the peoples greater security but also permitting the allocation of more resources for an improvement in people's living conditions.

The position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and their specific proposals were reflected in the collective memorandum "Disarmament for Development" submitted by the CSSR delegation.

The memorandum emphasizes the need for an immediate halt to the arms race and the adoption of genuine and urgent disarmament measures. For this purpose the socialist countries proposed a program of the deliverance of the planet by the year 2000 from nuclear and other types of weapon of mass destruction, a lowering of states' military potentials to a reasonable sufficiency and the building of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world.

The resources released in the course of disarmament must not be directed toward other military ends. Some of the resources actually released should be used for increased assistance to the developing countries. The role of special mechanism for transferring resources in disarmament to the developing countries and for solution of other global problems could be performed in an international "disarmament for development" foundation open to all states.

The socialist countries advocated examination of the interrelationship between disarmament and development at a meeting of the top leaders of members of the UN Security Council.

The latest round of the meeting of representatives of the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which ended at the end of summer in Vienna, showed the existence of certain prerequisites for agreement on the fact that the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe would be continued after Vienna and that, probably, negotiations could begin on conventional arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Practically all the delegations participating in the Vienna meeting supported a continuation of the Stockholm conference. Different opinions as to what new confidence-building measures it should study were revealed, it is true.

At the center of attention of the discussion on humanitarian issues was the socialist countries' proposal concerning the convening in Moscow of an all-European conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation.

In an interview which he gave at the end of the meeting Yu.V. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation, observed that "two lines clash in the field of humanitarian relations: one is geared to an expansion of cooperation and a departure from confrontation, and the other, pursued by the United States and some of its allies, to reducing the entire vast set of problems merely to rules of citizens' departure for other countries."

In respect of the so-called "second basket" of the Helsinki process the socialist countries advocated that after Vienna large-scale all-European conferences be held on the development of East-West trade and economic cooperation, environmental protection and the development of scientific ties.

In addition to joint activity to solve problems of a global scale, which is a principal, priority direction of socialist foreign policy, the Warsaw Pact countries attach great significance to initiatives contributing to a relaxation of tension and a strengthening of security in individual regions of the European continent. The program for the creation of a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries 300 km wide, which was put forward jointly by the GDR and the CSSR; the idea proposed by Bulgaria and Romania of making the Balkan peninsula a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons; Romania's initiative concerning a moratorium on an increase in the military spending of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries for a period of 1-2 years; and others may be cited among such proposals.

The socialist countries' approach to problems of international security is based on a considered and prudent combination of state interests, traditions and the geographical position of each of them and the common goals of the socialist community.

An example of an active international policy in the disarmament sphere has been set in recent months by Poland.

The Polish Government has repeatedly put forward proposals aimed at a halt to the arms race in Europe, a normalization of the situation on the continent and the creation of conditions for practical progress in the disarmament sphere. We would recall in this connection the plan proposed in 1957 for the creation of a nuclear-free zone, and in 1964, the plan providing for a nuclear arms freeze in Central Europe. The initiatives displayed by Poland would undoubtedly, if realized, permit an acceleration of the movement toward stability in Europe and a strengthening of security in the world.

In May 1987 W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, put forward a plan for arms reduction and confidence-building in Central Europe, the basic provisions of which were detailed in a Polish Government memorandum issued in July. "The Polish Government is convinced," this document says, "that conditions exist at the present time contributing to the

adoption of measures aimed at ensuring for European states undiminished and equal security given a level of their potentials considerably lower than the existing level".

The "Jaruzelski Plan" provides for the gradual withdrawal of and a reduction in jointly agreed types of operational-tactical nuclear weapons and also conventional arms and a change in the nature of military doctrines into strictly defensive doctrines.

The Polish initiative concerns a broad range of problems of the European continent, where a tremendous quantity of lethal weapons is concentrated. The plan encompasses the territory of Belgium, Hungary, the GDR, the FRG, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the CSSR and Poland, including their territorial waters and air space.

While geared to the strengthening of the security of its country and its allies, Poland's proposals contain nothing that would infringe the interests of other European countries.

Elaborated as a concept of regional agreements on disarmament issues, the Polish plan has become an integral part of the strategy of the entire socialist community. This was said plainly in a W. Jaruzelski speech: "Our peace initiatives are of a specific, comprehensive and open nature. They are mutually complementary, linking national and regional priorities with the interests of the alliance as a whole."

On 15 June M.S. Gorbachev met with J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee and chairman of the MPR People's Great Hural Presidium, who was in Moscow en route home following visits to Hungary and Bulgaria.

There was an exchange of information and opinions on the course of fulfillment of the decisions of recent congresses and plenums of the central committees of both parties, on the most important tasks of socialist building and the international activity of the Soviet Union and Mongolia and on the further development of bilateral cooperation.

The leaders of the fraternal countries emphasized the possibility of an increase in the efforts of the socialist countries and all states, large and small, for the purpose of a strengthening of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, the elimination of centers of tension and the development of good-neighbor relations.

In June USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze paid an official friendly visit to three East European socialist countries—Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. In the course of his meetings with leaders of the foreign policy departments and party figures and statesmen of the fraternal countries there was an exchange of opinions on problems of the socioeconomic development of our states and the progress of the restructuring in the Soviet

Union and implementation of the plans outlined by the fraternal parties for a further improvement in production and social relations in their states and a broad range of international problems and questions of bilateral relations were discussed.

E.A. Shevardnadze notified Bulgarian, Hungarian and Yugoslav colleagues in detail of the Soviet Union's new initiatives in the sphere of disarmament, security and international cooperation. The leaders of the socialist countries expressed sincere support for the multilevel activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the creation of the foundations of an all-embracing system of international security, emphasizing particularly the significance of the USSR's flexible and constructive approach to such an important set of problems for the planet's fate as is on the agenda of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva.

In connection with the tasks pertaining to a strengthening of the potential of peace and disarmament in Europe we would like to emphasize that the utmost development of the all-European process, preservation of the "spirit of Helsinki" and the conversion of Europe into the "common home" of all those living here were and remain a principal direction of the Soviet Union's international activity.

3. International Security: Regional Aspects

The idea of the indivisibility of peace as a most important postulate of Soviet foreign policy philosophy implies the common responsibility of the states of today for the fate of civilization. Security in the world cannot be ensured even by having settled problems in this region or the other and this part or the other of the globe. All must participate in the accomplishment of this task. Security can only be general or it will be imaginary. It may be achieved only by having eliminated all "flash points," having resolved all contentious issues, without detriment to others, and having removed the accumulated disagreements and contradictions of an interstate nature on the paths of respect for the legitimate interests of all countries and mutually profitable cooperation between them. It is for this reason that the socialist community countries support the elimination of regional conflicts and the conversion of civilized relations between them into a rule of international life.

There has been a marked stimulation in recent years in the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The events occurring in this part of the world and the development trends of the situation testify to the opportuneness of the Soviet Union's formulation of the question of the incorporation of the Asia-Pacific region in the general process of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security.

The problems of security in Asia are, of course, extremely complex. As distinct from Europe, where, albeit not as effectively as might be desired, a concerted mechanism

designed to contribute to the maintenance of stability on the continent operates, in the Asia-Pacific region the picture is different: no such multilateral system exists, and there is practically no experience here of the solution of regional security issues. In a number of cases social, economic, political, national and other antagonisms—both within individual countries and between them—are exacerbated. Dangerous centers of conflict persist. Political barriers are less clearly drawn than in Europe. Contrasts of development are striking. The accelerated movement of a number of states, primarily Japan, toward the foremost boundaries of S&T progress is the next-door neighbor here of the horrifying poverty of other countries. According to information of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 518 million persons are living under conditions of absolute poverty, which constitutes 89 percent of the world's poor.

A particular threat to Asian and international security emanates from the gathering pace of militarization of the region and the growth here of arsenals of nuclear and conventional arms. The Pacific zone as a whole is not yet as militarized as Europe. But the potential of this process is enormous, and considering the existence of conflict situations, the consequences of this would be extremely dangerous. The United States has deployed nuclear weapon delivery systems at its bases in Japan. There are approximately 1,000 American nuclear warheads and numerous delivery systems therefor on the territory of South Korea. Washington has resolved to deploy here—in the south of the peninsula—Lance operational-tactical missiles capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear and neutron warheads.

There has in recent years been a stimulation of U.S. imperialist circles' attempts to use the Asia-Pacific region as an arena of military-political confrontation with the USSR and other socialist countries and as a proving ground of the struggle against the forces of national and social liberation. All this makes the situation in Asia and the Pacific highly complex, tense and contradictory and confronts the states concerned with the task of seeking in unison ways to strengthen peace in this region.

The USSR's approach to Asian security and the Soviet plan of comprehensive action in this direction were set forth in documents of the 27th CPSU Congress and in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok in July 1986 and his replies to questions from the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka*. The Soviet program proposes primarily a settlement of regional conflicts; erecting a barrier in the way of the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific; beginning negotiations on a reduction in the activity in the Pacific of navies, primarily ships equipped with nuclear weapons; resuming the negotiations on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace; moving bit by bit, in stages, toward a radical reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Asia

to a reasonable sufficiency; putting on a practical footing the discussion of confidence-building measures and the nonuse of force in the region.

The USSR has begun the practical implementation of this program, having proven in practice its devotion to the idea of the creation of an Asian system of security and its readiness for the constructive solution of the problems troubling the peoples of this part of the world.

A practical step in its realization was, specifically, the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Mongolia of a number of units from the limited contingents of Soviet forces temporarily stationed in these countries at the request of their governments.

The changes for the better in Soviet-Chinese relations are conducive to a strengthening of security in Asia. The USSR and the PRC occupy identical or close positions on many international problems. Our two socialist states have been the sole nuclear powers to undertake never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The report that the USSR was ready to discuss with the PRC specific steps aimed at a commensurate lowering of the level of the two sides' ground forces elicited extensive world comment.

Time has confirmed the viability of the ideas contained in the Vladivostok program. Striking evidence of this was the Delhi Declaration signed by M.S. Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi, which recorded the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons. The adopted document has become a symbol of the new political thinking in international affairs and a nontraditional political-philosophical approach to fundamental problems of interstate relations. The declaration is not of a narrow regional nature, and the principles formulated therein express values common to all mankind and are in keeping with the loftiest ideals of democratic thought.

The Rarotonga Treaty, which proclaimed the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone, was drawn up. The conference this summer of ASEAN foreign ministers discussed the question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. The sponsors of this idea—Indonesia and Malaysia—proposed using the Rarotonga Treaty as a model. Among other positive changes on the continent attesting the growth of the interest of the population of countries of the Asia-Pacific region in ridding themselves of nuclear weapons we may put the growing demands for the removal from the Korean peninsula of American nuclear weapons, the inclusion in the wording of the new Philippines Constitution of a provision to the effect that the Philippines would pursue a policy of the renunciation of nuclear weapons on its territory, China's assertiveness in disarmament questions and the decisive condemnation by Australia and New Zealand of French nuclear tests in the Pacific.

However, as a whole, the situation in the Asia-Pacific region remains complex and contradictory. Pakistan's nuclear program has become a destabilizing factor. Dangerous international conflicts, whose settlement is frequently being imperiled by the position of imperialist countries, persist. An explosive situation has been created in the Persian Gulf.

Such an above-mentioned large-scale Soviet initiative as the proposal concerning a "global double zero" announced in July by M.S. Gorbachev in replies to questions from the Indonesian paper *Merdeka* testifies to the USSR's constant search for new ways of strengthening international security, in the Asia-Pacific region included. This proposal, which was put on the agenda of the USSR-United States Geneva negotiations, applies directly to the Asia-Pacific region also.

Other proposals concerning possible measures aimed at ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific region were also expressed in the replies to the questions from the newspaper *MERDEKA*. Specifically, it was observed that the USSR was ready to undertake not to increase the numbers of nuclear weapon-carrying aircraft in the Asian part of the country if the United States did not additionally deploy in this region nuclear weapons which reach Soviet territory.

A readiness to reduce naval activity in the Pacific was confirmed also. After all, the line of confrontation runs there along the juxtaposition of the fleets. A limitation of the areas of navigation of ships carrying nuclear weapons such that they not approach the coastline of the other side to a distance of the range of their on-board nuclear weapons could be negotiated. Antisubmarine rivalry could be limited, and antisubmarine activity, aviation included, in certain zones could be prohibited. It might be possible in order to strengthen trust to reduce the scale and number of large-scale naval (including naval aviation) exercises and maneuvers in the Pacific and Indian oceans, not to conduct them in international straits and their adjacent areas and not use at exercises combat equipment in the zones of traditional sea lanes. All these initiatives could be tested in the Northern Pacific and then extended to its southern waters and other countries of the region.

The USSR considers it essential to move from standstill the business of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace in accordance with the UN declaration adopted 15 years ago and to convene, finally, under the aegis of this organization an international conference (which Washington has hitherto opposed). Our country proposes the creation of international security guarantees for shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the seas, straits and bays which are a part thereof and also guaranteed security for air traffic and the formulation of collective measures against terrorism on sea and air routes in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet concept of Pacific security proceeds from the fact that as all these and other steps are implemented it will be possible by means of bilateral efforts to seek the solution of contentious, frequently conflict, issues, strengthen the atmosphere of trust, create the prerequisites for the convening of an all-Asia forum and embark on the development of a wide-ranging security process similar to that which is under way in Europe.

The Soviet Union understands here, of course, that the automatic projection of the European experience onto Asia is inapplicable and unnecessary. We are not in the least disregarding the specifics of the Asia-Pacific region, for which we are frequently unjustly reproached by opponents of the idea of Asian security.

Nor are we imposing on anyone any readymade "prescriptions" for Asia. It is a question of the embodiment in practice by the joint efforts of states of the region, with regard for the Helsinki experience, of the principles and realization of the initiatives which are put forward by the Asian countries themselves.

Seventy years of October mean 70 years of the Soviet state's struggle for peace. Under the current difficult international conditions Soviet foreign policy is invariably based in the traditions of Lenin's Decree on Peace on the main principle: doing everything necessary to ensure for the Soviet people the possibility of engaging in constructive labor and living in peace with all peoples.

"The 70th anniversary of October," the CPSU Central Committee address to the Soviet people observed, "falls in a situation wherein the human race itself is facing the problem of survival. The future of the world—a contradictory, but single and interconnected world—is being determined today. The planet can and must be delivered from the threat of nuclear war. Life under conditions of security, independence and progress can and must be ensured for all peoples. Not everything depends on us—on the USSR, on socialism—here. But what does, we will do and will do in full."

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Yazov Writes on Pact Military Doctrine

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[Article by USSR Minister of Defense Army General Dmitriy Yazov: "Warsaw Treaty Military Doctrine—For Defence of Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] The document The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States was adopted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee held in Berlin on 28-29 May this year. Highly assessing the

document, the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee stated that it expresses precisely the defensive nature of the military strategy of socialism and promotes the development of dialogue between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and confidence building in Europe.

The document's principled provisions on the Warsaw Treaty military doctrine exemplify the new political thinking on issues of war and peace in the nuclear age and on problems of defence and equal security for all states. They fully accord with the interests of the socialist community as a whole and the national interests of each of the allied socialist countries, and do not run counter to the interests of any other state.

Why the need to issue the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states? What are its main features? How do the doctrine's provisions fit in with the military development of the Warsaw Treaty countries? All these questions evoke particular interest, since they reveal the goals and intentions of the allied socialist states and the essence of the new philosophy of security in the nuclear and space age.

The military doctrine of each state stems from its social system and policy and defines its attitude to the fundamental questions of war and peace. Inasmuch as major military-political alliances of states are a political reality in today's world and even stand opposed to one another, in addition to the national doctrines of the states comprising them, each of these alliances can have a general military doctrine.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is a qualitatively new socio-historical phenomenon that inevitably arose to defend the socialist gains of the working people from encroachments on the part of the aggressive forces of imperialism. The entire history of the Warsaw Treaty defensive alliance incontrovertibly proves that the socialist community countries have never threatened anyone and have never intended to attack anyone. Peace, not war, is needed for the building of socialism and communism. The peaceable policy of the allied socialist states determines precisely the nature of their military doctrine, which underlies the defensive activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and mirrors the community of defensive military-political goals of the fraternal countries.

The basic provisions of the military doctrine obtain from the policy of the communist and workers' parties of the Warsaw Treaty states. By officially setting forth today an integral military doctrine, the fraternal socialist countries are once again revealing to the world community their approach to war, peace and security in the context of the realities of the nuclear age. This approach is based on a profound understanding of the fact that in the present-day situation, where the huge stockpiled arsenals of nuclear weapons pose a threat to the very existence of humanity, nuclear war cannot be a means for attaining

political goals. "Today," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev points out, "it has become crystal-clear to everyone that old notions of war as a means of achieving political goals have become outmoded. In the nuclear age these outmoded dogmas breed a policy which can lead to a universal conflagration."

The nuclear threat is hanging over all and survival has become mankind's main concern. Aware of this, the allied socialist countries believe that today there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence, equitable cooperation and mutual understanding between all states. In present-day conditions competition between capitalism and socialism must only be peaceful.

The new situation requires a new approach to international security. The allied socialist countries are convinced that genuine security of every state and of the world as a whole depends not on the further growth of nuclear potentials or the development of new weapons of mass destruction but on cooperation between all states in bringing about a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. However, this thesis is rejected by the U.S. administration. It has not given up its hegemonist policy or its plans for social revenge and continues to count on the illusory benefits of power politics, fiercely resisting the new policy pursued by the socialist countries. This creates the risk of war and dangerous tensions in the world.

The decision of the Warsaw Treaty countries to make public their military doctrine has been prompted by the need to lessen these tensions by adopting measures that would help reduce troops and armaments, lower the risk of war and strengthen confidence. This makes it very important to properly understand the nature of military doctrines, because they testify to the aims and intentions of states and military-political alliances in the military sphere. The socialist countries propose that Warsaw Treaty and NATO experts meet, discuss without bias and explain to one another the substance and aims of their military doctrines, compare concepts and jointly study and try to reach agreement on their further evolution. That was one of the reasons why the Warsaw Treaty countries decided to publish their military doctrine. They suggest that the sides ascertain the sincerity of each other's aims and intentions and expect that at consultations the NATO countries will produce evidence confirming the sincerity of their leaders' assurances that they will use force only in response to aggression.

Inviting representatives of the NATO countries to compare the military doctrines of the two military-political alliances, the Warsaw Treaty countries explain the fundamental provisions and features of their doctrine, which testify to its defensive orientation.

The main aim of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries and of the military doctrine of every Warsaw Treaty member country is to solve the cardinal

problem facing mankind—the prevention of a nuclear and conventional war. Owing to their social system and peaceful policy, the allied socialist countries have never pinned their hopes for the future on military solutions of international problems. Now, under conditions of a nuclear confrontation, the solution of problems by military means is just impermissible. That is why the socialist countries insist that all international disputes be settled by peaceful, political means. Our military doctrine is a system of fundamental views on how to avert war, develop military capabilities and make a country and its armed forces ready to repel aggression. It also explains the methods of waging armed struggle in defence of socialism.

This means that the military doctrine of the socialist countries aims at preventing war and strengthening universal security. As the classics of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly stated, the Communists' aim is to rid society of the threat of war once and for all. Guided by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the communist parties of the other socialist countries believe that however great the threat to peace created by the policy of imperialism's aggressive forces, it is possible to avert war and save mankind from nuclear catastrophe. This is the historic mission of socialism and of all the progressive, peace-loving forces in the world.

The major feature of the Warsaw Treaty's military doctrine is its defensive character. Where does this manifest itself? In all our practical activity, domestic and foreign policy, and in military building.

The allied socialist states have declared to mankind that they will never, under any circumstances, be the first to start military actions against any state or an alliance of states unless they themselves become the target of armed attack and that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The USSR and other socialist countries have no territorial claims on any state in Europe or outside of it. The countries of the socialist community treat not a single nation or people as their enemy. On the contrary, they are ready to base relations with all the countries without exception on a mutual consideration of the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

The defensive orientation of the doctrine finds an immediate reflection in the field of the Warsaw Treaty countries' military building. Thus, the commitments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to start military actions were and remain an indispensable requirement in military building of the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries. It is realised in the practice of training staffs and troops, in the organisation of the strictest control, aimed at preventing the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons—from tactical to strategic, in enhancing the battle readiness of the armed forces for the repulsion of aggression, in their technical equipment, in the streamlining of control and communications, and in raising the morale of personnel.

All this is not a verbal assurance, but the specific programme of the Warsaw Treaty for building armed forces. At its base lies the principle of sufficiency for defence. What does this mean? Generally it means having just as many armed forces as is necessary for defence from an outside attack. It means specifically that the personnel of the armed forces, and the amount and quality of means of armed struggle are strictly commensurate with the level of military threat, and the character and intensiveness of the military preparations of imperialism; they are determined by the requirements necessary for assuring the safety of the Warsaw Treaty countries and for repulsing aggression. At the Political Consultative Committee meeting in Berlin it was stressed that the armed forces of the allied states are being kept in a state of battle readiness sufficient for avoiding a surprise attack. Should they nevertheless be attacked, they will give a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

Averting war and being ready to repulse the aggressor—these two tasks are mutually related and stem from the fact that the United States and NATO do not renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, are building up their strategic offensive potential on a vast scale in a bid to gain military superiority. In practice we constantly encounter the power politics of the North Atlantic Alliance, aimed at an arms race and at preparations for war. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger almost daily advocates a buildup of military preparations and a "struggle between the free world and communism." Threatening the socialist countries, he calls not for peaceful coexistence, but only for an "armed truce" in relations between the East and West. Behind this stand not words, but mountains of weapons, programmes to produce new, still more destructive types of arms, and the directives for their use.

The allied socialist states cannot but take all this into account. For it involves plans of encroachment on their sovereignty and independence. Therefore the Warsaw Treaty states regard the reliable assuring of their security as a prime duty to their peoples. For this purpose they must have an appropriate defensive potential and modern armed forces and armaments capable of protecting the peaceful work and peaceful life of people. The whole defence readiness system of the Warsaw Treaty is built in such a way as to halt the aggressor, wrest his criminal plans and, if aggression against any of the Treaty participants does become a fact through the imperialists' fault, decisively repulse it.

Any claims that the aggressor may remain unpunished are altogether groundless. We keep a watchful eye on the military preparations of the United States and NATO, perceive and properly assess the dangerous trends which emerge in this process, and in this connection see to it that our defence potential develops appropriately. When we speak about maintaining the armed forces, our military potential within the limits of reasonable sufficiency, we mean that at the present stage the essence of sufficiency for the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet

Union is determined by the need to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack in any, even the most unfavourable situation. As far as conventional weapons are concerned, sufficiency envisages an amount and quality of armed forces and armaments which would be enough to reliably ensure collective defence of the socialist community. The limits of sufficiency are determined not by us but by the actions of the United States and NATO. The Warsaw Treaty member states do not strive for military superiority and do not claim greater security than other countries but they will never agree to lesser security and will never tolerate military superiority over them.

The existing military-strategic parity remains the decisive factor of preventing war. In the context of the huge destructive power of modern weapons, nuclear and conventional, the existing approximate balance of the military forces of the two alliances makes a war between them senseless. The parity ensures the possibility of taking retaliatory actions in any situation and doing unacceptable damage to the aggressor.

Does this mean that, as the level of military equilibrium rises, the strategic situation in the world will remain stable and security—reliable? No, not at all. Conversely, as experience shows, the further enhancement of the level of parity does not bring greater security. The continuation of the arms race inevitably increases the war danger and can bring it to the limits when even parity would cease to be a factor of military-strategic deterrence. That is why the task of outlawing nuclear weapons, eliminating them and other weapons of mass destruction stage by stage, and drastically reducing the military confrontation is becoming ever more pressing. Proceeding from the principle of sufficiency, the Warsaw Treaty member states propose reducing the military potentials, of course on a mutual basis, down to the level when neither side, while ensuring its defence, would have forces and means for offensive actions.

Basing themselves on their defensive doctrine, the USSR and Warsaw Treaty states are persistently working to attain objectives aimed at stopping the arms race, achieving specific results in the sphere of disarmament, and eliminating the nuclear threat. They prove this by their practical deeds.

For a year and a half the Soviet Union did not conduct nuclear tests while the United States was intensifying its explosions in Nevada. Today, too, we are ready to halt the nuclear tests on a mutual basis on any day and in any month. As is known, the United States does not want to stop nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union has done everything to create real opportunities for concluding an agreement on medium-range and enhanced-range tactical missiles. It has made serious compromises by agreeing not to take into account the British and French nuclear missiles and by putting off the issue of medium-range air forces.

Bearing in mind the security interests of the Asian states, the USSR expressed its readiness to scrap all its medium-range and enhanced-range tactical missiles not only in Europe but also in the Asian part of the USSR, provided, of course, that the United States does the same. It must be noted here that the USSR leaves aside the question of all other U.S. nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, we hope that the United States will refrain from building up its nuclear potential in that region.

Owing to this far-reaching Soviet initiative there is nothing to prevent the nuclear powers now from taking the first step towards major nuclear arms reductions, which would probably pave the way for other, even larger agreements. Everything now depends on the United States and NATO.

Also on the negotiating table are the other constructive Soviet proposals: on radical (by 50 percent) strategic offensive arms reductions by the USSR and the United States with a simultaneous reinforcement of the regime of the ABM Treaty, including a ban on all tests of space components of ABM systems in outer space; on full cessation of nuclear testing with strict international verification, including on-site inspections; on the banning and scrapping of chemical and other mass destruction weapons.

A special role in practical actions by the Warsaw Treaty nations is rightfully assigned to Europe, a region where large groups of the armed forces of the two military-political alliances directly confront each other and where two world wars had earlier begun in this century. To reduce the level of that military confrontation, the socialist countries at their Budapest conference in June 1986 came up with a proposal for sizable reductions of the armed forces, tactical nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Regrettably, the NATO countries have not given any answer to that proposal.

The socialist countries proceed from the conviction that the arms reduction process must be continuous so as to rule out the very military-technical possibility of attack by either side. Any other approach in that process is inadmissible, just as it is inadmissible in reducing some types of armaments to launch the arms race in other directions. The allied socialist states are urging the NATO countries to display self-restraint in the military sphere and to give up the use of military force on a reciprocal basis.

They also believe that there is a chance to resolve such a crucial problem that preoccupies the European nations today as the limitation of the sides' opportunities for a surprise attack. To that end they are suggesting concrete measures such as reducing the concentration of troops and armaments in the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances to an agreed minimum level; removing from that zone the more dangerous, offensive arms

systems; building a 300-kilometre-wide nuclear-free corridor along the Warsaw Treaty-NATO line of contact (up to 150 kilometres deep into each side's territory) and removing all nuclear weapons from that corridor on a reciprocal basis; setting up in Europe zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons and zones of reduced arms concentration and higher mutual confidence. All these proposals, however, have been turned down by NATO.

The socialist countries call on other nations, especially the NATO states, to compare their military doctrines with that of the Warsaw Treaty. NATO countries allege that their military doctrine, one of "flexible response" with an emphasis on the first nuclear strike, is also defensive. However, this can deceive only simpletons. We see that the United States and its NATO partners are persistently trying to enhance their security not in cooperation with other countries but, at the latter's expense and secure military superiority through the arms race, in particular by extending it to new areas. Hence their refusal to start real nuclear disarmament and to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, their regular major military exercises near the borders of socialist states and their stepping up tensions on various regions. None of this tallies with allegations that their doctrine is defensive.

The NATO doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" also has nothing to do with defence. Why? Rooted in the cold-war period, this doctrine is self-contradictory and dangerous. After all you cannot simultaneously admit that a nuclear conflict would lead to a holocaust and insist on preserving nuclear weapons as a peace-keeper. The NATO doctrine blocks resolution of the nuclear problem. Encouraging the arms race, it stimulates the stockpiling of deadly weapons, makes the military equilibrium fragile and increases the risk of a nuclear war.

Responsibility for international tension lies primarily with the United States. Reluctant to give up the arms race, the U.S. ruling circles intend to deploy weapons in outer space to threaten the whole of mankind from there. There is a double-standard policy. While paying lip-service to strategic stability and an atmosphere of trust, they are encroaching upon the parity, steering for a military superiority and greater asymmetry in armaments and military personnel of the sides. The extensive war preparations by the United States and its NATO allies, their growing military presence near the USSR and other socialist countries, unending provocative violations of their air, space and sea borders, delirious schemes to dismantle the social system in the socialist countries and other hostile imperialist activities undermine peace and security everywhere.

Of late, with Washington's prompting, the West has been going out of its way to present the certain flaws in organising our airspace combat patrolling as a weakness of the Soviet Armed Forces and encourage some hot-heads to test our security in other areas.

To put it bluntly, we wouldn't advise anyone to check our strength. Our answer to provocations is the growing defensive might of the Warsaw Treaty states and the rising vigilance and combat readiness of their armed forces.

This refers, in the first place, to the personnel on combat duty and their arms and equipment. These forces are able and ready to act in any situation at any time.

Geared exclusively to repulsing the external military threat, the Warsaw Treaty defensive military doctrine does not mean that we will be passive. We will rely on the firm foundation of Lenin's teaching about the defence of the socialist homeland. Together with the armies of our socialist allies, the Soviet Armed Forces will most resolutely uphold our socialist achievements against aggression. The security of our homeland and that of the socialist community as a whole is sacred to us.

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New Security Concept Expounded

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[Article by Pyotr Vladimirovskiy: "Comprehensive Security Equal for All"; passages in italics as published]

[Text] It is a tragic paradox of the nuclear and space age that humanity with its tremendous power over the forces of nature, finds itself threatened with global annihilation. This paradox conditions the dialectics of the development of civilisation in the epoch of the scientific and technological revolution. Modern science offers people fantastic, unprecedented prospects for progress, and yet it can give political adventurers weapons that would wipe out all life on Earth if used. Such is the crying contradiction confronting humanity at the threshold of the 21st century.

How will the world ultimately use the achievements of man's genius? Will they be used for the good of humanity or against it?

The reasonable choice would seem to be in favour of development and greater security. The approach to this dilemma, however, has revealed with particular clarity the fundamental difference between the socialist and capitalist systems. The programme documents of the CPSU have demonstrated the inseparable connection between socialism and peace, the historic mission of the Soviet Union as standard-bearer of the forces which must save humanity from a nuclear catastrophe.

The 27th CPSU Congress advanced a new political concept calling for a just and safe world in which theory and practice, politics and morals, national and universal interests would be inseparable.

The Fundamental Principles of a Comprehensive International Security System formulated by the Congress concretise the new political thinking with which the Soviet Union invites all its partners in the world to enter the 21st century.

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw imperialism step up its war preparations on the international scene as it became more aggressive. The leading role in this process was assumed by the United States, where the right conservative sector of the ruling class captured the political initiative, pushing aside liberal as well as centrist politicians.

Blueprint for Real Deeds

According to the new political thinking the world is a single interconnected whole.

However, it is not simply an abstract, speculative pattern but a blueprint for real deeds in all aspects and in every sphere of international relations, primarily the military-political sphere.

Prompted by the new political thinking, the Soviet Union and its allies propose materialising this thinking by accomplishing concrete, tangible deeds.

The Geneva meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President Ronald Reagan of the United States (19-21 November 1985) was a major international event. It marked the beginning of a dialogue aimed at improving Soviet-U.S. relations, whose decisive sphere is security; at the core of this dialogue are the inherently interlinked tasks of averting the militarisation of outer space and reducing nuclear armaments.

Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement of 15 January 1986, which formulated the Soviet Union's programme for security through disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world, found a world-wide response. The programme envisages the restructuring of military-political relations in a nuclear-weapons-free international system to ensure maximum strategic stability, with neither side able to attack, using conventional forces and armaments for large-scale offensive operations. This is the aim of the principle proposed by the Soviet Union for reducing the military potentials of the opposing sides to the levels of reasonable sufficiency.

During the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik (11-12 October 1986), the USSR put forward a package of major proposals for nuclear disarmament based on the programme for eliminating nuclear weapons which was

formulated on 15 January 1986. As a result of sharp controversies at the Reykjavik summit the positions of the negotiating sides moved closer together in two out of three areas. The logic of the talks led the two sides to set specific time limits for the elimination of strategic offensive arms. Accords were also reached on the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and on a drastic reduction of missiles of this class in Asia. Mikhail Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union attached fundamental importance to these accords. They showed the feasibility of nuclear disarmament.

Regrettably, the U.S. side foiled the conclusion of a major agreement which the two countries came so close to for the first time in the history of their relations. The U.S. administration actually refused to cooperate in strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty, in adopting measures to keep the arms race out of space. Washington's commitment to the SDI programme made it impossible to achieve at Reykjavik what would have been unprecedented progress towards solving the problem of nuclear disarmament.

Developments after Reykjavik showed that those politicians and business people in the United States and some other capitalist countries associated with militarism, who derive gigantic profits from the arms race, were frightened. They made frantic efforts to block the incipient advance in disarmament. The system of fundamental accords limiting strategic armaments was struck a telling blow by the U.S. administration's decision at the end of 1986 to exceed to total limit of 1,320 nuclear weapon vehicles set by the SALT-2 Treaty, that is, the fielding of a 131st heavy bomber equipped with long-range cruise missiles, a step taken without dismantling any equivalent nuclear weapon carrier in compensation for it.

Many sober-minded commentators even in the United States rightly point out that Washington is making things difficult for itself by following an outdated formula of its pre-nuclear thinking: "The more arms there are, the better for national security." Real world security, including the security of the United States, does not lie in a maniacal stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction.

Mikhail Gorbachev has stressed that "time demands a constructive answer to the question: 'What is to be done?'; it demands an alternative to power politics, to 'nuclear deterrence' and to military doctrines based on intimidation." This is, indeed, the answer given by the concept of a comprehensive international security system which the 27th CPSU Congress put forward.

The Realism of the Political Thinking

The very advancing of this concept set off heated political debates in the world. It brought out the dividing line between those who think in terms of the power methods of the pre-nuclear period, placing their selfish interests

above the interests of the world community, and those who are discarding time-worn dogmas, identifying their national interests with the interests of humanity.

In these debates socialism comes forward as an exponent of progressive socio-political thought and the humanist, democratic ideals of all humanity. By rejecting the traditional view on ways of achieving security, it expresses the sentiments of those who demand a new, realistic and responsible approach to world affairs in the nuclear and space era.

Answering the question "What is to be done?", the traditionalists relying on force primarily military force, propose a military-technological solution in the form of an arms buildup and preparations for various options of nuclear or conventional war. Those who think in new terms have no doubt that the nature of today's weapons leaves no country any chance of defending itself solely by military technological means. They regard the attainment of security as a problem which can and must be solved exclusively by political means.

As for the parameters of security, the traditionalists restrict it to the military and political aspects. But those who refuse to think in orthodox terms consider that security cannot be achieved only through efforts in the military and political spheres of international relations. It must not leave out the economic, ecological and human spheres. In other words, security must be comprehensive, must constitute an integral system encompassing all the spheres of international relations.

Lastly, in answering the question "What is to be done?", the traditionalists take an egocentric stand by putting national security interests above the interests of international security and trying to safeguard their security at the expense of other nations. In keeping with the new political thinking, this approach must be rejected, for the greatest wisdom does not consist in seeing exclusively to one's interests, let alone in defending them to the detriment of the other side, but in ensuring that all nations feel equally safe. *Security as regards international relations must be universal and as regards Soviet-U.S. relations, reciprocal.*

Realism and responsibility for the future of nations dictate a choice in favour of the new foreign-policy thinking and not of the traditionalist approach.

In the interdependent and interconnected world in which humanity with all its problems and contradictions now lives, a nuclear first strike (should some country venture to deliver it) would be an act of suicide; it would be the last act. Radioactive death and "nuclear winter" recognise no national, geographical or ideological boundaries. The threat of annihilation has equalised all countries and social systems, intimately linked them together by a common fate and made survival the chief task. Survival is inseparable from security, with which

nations from time immemorial have justly associated the existence of reliable external conditions for their free, independent and peaceful development.

In the nuclear and space era, no nation can forever build its security solely on fear of retaliation. The price of continued adherence to the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" is much too high, yet this doctrine is invoked as justification for persistent nuclear testing, the renunciation of SALT-1 and SALT-2 and the disruption of the ABM Treaty. Extension of the arms race to outer space would make the partition between war and peace still thinner and pose a permanent threat to the security of all and sundry.

Besides, the appearance of new weapons threatens to hand over decision-making to computers, or systems of an "artificial intellect." This would put humanity in bondage to technology, which is apt to fail, as the recent Challenger crash and Chernobyl accident showed. And then, the weapons systems now in the making are so sophisticated that it would be virtually impossible to come to terms on controlling them. Now that states are globally interdependent, national security cannot be safeguarded even by settling all military and political problems. The existence of unsolved economic and humanitarian problems is a further source of potential violence.

Hence the only reasonable scenario of a peaceful future for humanity is a comprehensive and universal security based on mutual confidence, equal for all.

To be sure, such a system would not automatically remove all existing difficulties and contradictions in international relations. As in the past, their dialectics will always be made up of a combination of confrontation and cooperation. But the system would provide conditions for this dialectical interaction to be dominated by cooperation making it possible to settle all problems by peaceful, non-military means and for confrontation to be devoid of an irreconcilable character. This would enable humanity to survive in the nuclear age.

New Approach to Security

Ways to international security have been previously explored as well. The concept of collective security is widely known. *A comprehensive, universal security system* is a qualitatively new stage in the evolution of the concept of security, one which not only encompasses and concretises the ideas of collective security but, more important still, adds to them with due regard to the conditions imposed by the nuclear and space era. It is a new and higher level of the philosophy of world politics characterised by the primacy of universal interests.

First, collective security was not seen as having to go beyond the abolition of existing or potential hotbeds of war in various regions. The Charter of the United

Nations, which contains both the principles and the mechanism of functioning of collective security, confines itself to individual steps against the threat of a breach of peace or an act of aggression. The order of the day now is security at the global, planetary level precluding the use or even threat of force in any part of the globe and at any scene of world politics.

Second, collective security was established by a group of states who become victims of aggression and has been directed against aggressors of the past and potential new ones. Security today does not single out any one group of states but is intended to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of all states on an equal basis. It is therefore focussed on providing conditions for the guaranteed absence of war, first among them are disarmament measures, primarily in the nuclear field.

Third, collective security proceeded from the inevitability of military conflicts and therefore accentuated the need to curb aggression. The new concept of security is based on rejecting both nuclear and conventional war. It attaches exceptional importance to preventive measures in addition to raising material and legal barriers to the use of force.

According to the new concept of security, it is a question of building a positive world (to use a phrase common among political scientists).

The concept of comprehensive and universal security has the following characteristics:

- *A comprehensive approach.* The new concept of security calls for a restructuring of every sphere of international intercourse to rule out war, violence and diktat. The concept of "comprehensive" security, Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "should be both horizontal, covering all countries and regions, and vertical, taking into account all the factors behind international relations—military, political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian. In building an edifice of security, we should show equal concern for each storey and each section."

- *Dynamism.* The new concept of security is not a static model. On the contrary, the establishment of a comprehensive security system is a steadily unfolding process of international cooperation characterised by a gradual, phased transition from simple to more complex forms.

- *Realism.* The concept of comprehensive security is intended to meet the fundamental interests of all countries: large, medium and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, developed and developing. It evolves from international practice and no single country can have the monopoly on it. It is no substitute for existing international documents and mechanisms brought into being in the pre-nuclear period but is, on the contrary, aimed at reinforcing them with due regard to the new situation as well as to the experience of international cooperation in these conditions.

- *Humanism and high moral standards.* Concern for the survival of mankind, that is, concern for man as an absolute value, and effort to reliably guarantee his paramount right, the right to life, are primary. To this end peaceful coexistence must become the highest universal principle, a principle having priority over ideological, national and other considerations.

- *Democracy.* Given universal and comprehensive security, there will be no room for either an exclusive nuclear club or military space vassalage. Decision-making on war and peace will be democratised. The atom and space as the common property of humanity will serve the common weal.

The concept of a comprehensive international security system is based on the *policy of peaceful coexistence*, which the nuclear and space era has made imperative for all nations. The elevation of this policy to the *highest principle of international relations* reflects the overriding significance of renouncing war as a means of settling disputes, including the historical dispute between socialism and capitalism, which can only proceed in the form of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry.

The concept of comprehensive security is intimately linked with the idea of making peaceful coexistence a *universal standard of international relations*. This means establishing an international order dominated by good-neighbourly relations and cooperation and not by military strength, with extensive interchanges in science, technology and culture for the good of all nations.

Military security is lent a new content. It should be based on the principles of the nuclear powers renouncing war against each other or against third countries (meaning nuclear or conventional war), preventing an arms race in outer space, ending all testing of nuclear weapons, fully eliminating them by the end of this century, banning and destroying chemical weapons and refraining from developing other means of mass destruction. Furthermore, military security should include a strictly controlled lowering of the military capabilities of countries to reduce them to a level of reasonable sufficiency, the dissolution of military alignments and, as a step to it, the renunciation of their extension and of the formation of new ones, a proportional and commensurate reduction of military budgets.

A new approach is also taken to the crucial issue of military security, that of a rough strategic parity between the Soviet Union and United States, between the WTO and NATO. According to an objective assessment of military political realities, such a parity serves military political containment and hence the maintenance of peace. The balance of conventional armaments likewise plays a very important role. With regard to certain parameters, the role of the latter in the context of the "nuclear stalemate" is growing.

The present level of parity in nuclear capabilities has become excessive. The equal danger for either side ensured by it cannot forever remain the basis for peace on Earth. The new political thinking brings to the fore the issue of reducing the capabilities of countries to a reasonably sufficient level. The task is to ensure that either side has armed forces capable of carrying out none but defensive operations on its own territory and the territory of its allies, without being able to threaten the other side with invasion. *Consistent and full application of the principle of reasonable sufficiency implies abolishing all nuclear weapons everywhere.*

The issue of military doctrines and concepts is gaining in importance in assessing the real intentions of military political alignments as well as individual states. It must be tackled if the mutual suspicion and distrust that have been accumulating for years are to be eliminated. Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "There is no doubt that on a broad philosophical and political plane trust is at the core of universal security." In the interest of security, the military concepts and doctrines of military alliances should be based on defensive principles. This means binding oneself never to start military operations against another country in any circumstances, except as a means of fighting off aggression, something which also presupposes keeping military parity to the lowest possible level. The members of both the WTO and NATO declare that their alliance are defensive. It follows that there should be no obstacle to substantial reciprocal reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

Political security, too, is lent a much richer content. Its point of departure is unqualified respect in international affairs for the right of every nation to sovereignly choose the paths and forms of its development. After all, it is encroachments on independence, acts flouting the right of every nation to independent choice and their own path of development, that breed distrust, with all the dangerous consequences for humanity ensuing in this complicated age.

What is meant in practice is the elimination of existing conflict and crisis situations and the prevention of new ones at the regional and global level. This necessitates a political basis for settlement not prejudicing the legitimate interests of either side. Also needed is an adequate negotiation mechanism making it possible to proceed to a constructive dialogue in any given situation.

At the same time, it is important to supplement a comprehensive security system with a corresponding system of *international law and order* guaranteeing adherence to the universally recognised principles of civilised behaviour of states on the international scene, such as non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for sovereignty. There is also a need for preventive measures.

Building political security connotes the planning of fundamentally new actions, of a set of measures to foster trust between countries, provide effective safeguards against attack from without and guarantee the inviolability of frontiers. It is very important to devise effective ways of combatting international terrorism, including measures to ensure the safety of international overland, air and sea routes.

Thus, the concept of establishing a comprehensive security system has a concrete material content in the political sphere as well and offers the necessary basis for joint efforts by states.

In addition, the proposed comprehensive international security system should be based on universally recognised principles of international cooperation in the economic sphere. Important progress could be made by, for instance, setting up a new world economic order guaranteeing all countries equal economic security and ensuring steady and guaranteed development of world economic ties. Economic security must necessarily be based on excluding all discrimination from international relations, and on renouncing the policy of economic blockades and sanctions. A joint search for ways of settling the debt problem on a fair basis should be a further important principle.

An end to wasting material and intellectual resources on the development of weapons of mass destruction would open up real prospects for releasing resources to aid developing countries. By and large, the elaboration of principles for using these resources for the good of the world community, primarily developing countries, should become one of the foundations of comprehensive security.

Lastly, the purpose of economic security is to pave the way for rationally using the resources of the planet as universal property for the solution of global problems affecting the very foundations of the existence of civilisation. One of the basic principles of economic security could be international cooperation in exploring outer space and using it for peaceful purposes, and hence the drawing up of a joint action programme by countries to this end. Implementation of this extensive programme would enable humanity to enter the 21st century with "star peace" on a dependable material, legal and organisational basis and not with the suicidal armoury of Star Wars.

What is new in the nuclear-space era is not only the economic but also the ecological aspect of security. Today, environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources is a vital prerequisite for ensuring safe conditions for the existence of the human race.

There is another facet to comprehensive security, its humanitarian aspect. The very concept of comprehensive security is aimed at accomplishing the most humane tasks facing mankind: preventing war and assuring people their paramount natural right to live in a climate of peace and freedom.

Action in the humanitarian sphere of security would be expected to cover a wide range of measures, such as raising the level of general objective information, acquainting nations with one another's life, ending all discrimination, defending human rights, promoting cooperation in culture, the arts, science, education and medicine. A matter of primary importance is to explicitly ban all propaganda for war, hatred and violence and to desist from a stereotyped thinking in terms of treating other nations as "enemies."

How today's acute humanitarian problems are solved will directly condition progress towards truly civilised, proper standards of international intercourse and cooperation. Peace will be precarious for as long as exploitation prevents millions from exercising their inalienable social rights, for as long as imperialist reaction flouts human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of whole peoples.

Thus, security in every area of relations between states would bring into being dovetailing systems of guarantees. These would merge into one as it were, cementing the entire system.

A Common Cause

Building a comprehensive international security system is not a privilege of the elect. Its formation and functioning should involve all countries and not merely those possessing a major military potential. Each state should assume its share of responsibility and contribute to the common effort.

An analysis of the political philosophy and actual content of the concept of comprehensive security shows that this philosophy has its roots in the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy. This concept is a continuation of our country's Leninist tradition of approaching public opinion and the governments of all countries with large-scale proposals of a fundamental nature indicating a real alternative to the disastrous line which aggressive imperialist forces are urging the international community to pursue.

The idea of peaceful coexistence, which runs through Lenin's Decree on Peace and which the Soviet Union has upheld throughout its history, is now given a new spur and more dynamic, concrete and meaningful forms with due regard to the stage attained by international development and to the foreseeable future.

A new theory of international relations is forming, the theory of international security in an integral, interconnected world. But the new philosophy of security is not merely a product of the achievements of theoretical thought. These achievements are inseparable from political practice and directed entirely towards concrete deeds. In other words, it is not a question of "pure theory" but of having the new political thinking serve as

a guide to making concrete decisions, dealing with problems that compound international relations, ending the deadlock to which imperialist power politics has led them and ultimately restructuring totally international relations and remoulding the style and behaviour of countries in accordance with the need to bring about a safe, dependable and just world.

What makes the concept of comprehensive security for all related to Lenin's approach to international affairs is political sober-mindedness, a well-considered, and realistic approach. It is *political realism* that has enabled the Soviet Union to achieve many positive results in lessening international tensions and to prove that the most difficult security problems, military ones included, can be solved in today's world and that elements of responsibility can play a notable part in the activity of farsighted Western statesmen.

Now the Soviet Union, which is seeking a revival of the detente process, does not merely call for a return to what was achieved in the previous decade. The concept of comprehensive security goes much further than this. It regards detente as a necessary but still a transitional stage in a fundamental restructuring of international relations on qualitatively new principles guaranteeing the security of all countries in general and each of them in particular.

The new political thinking and mode of action of countries with different socio-political systems have found their embodiment in an important document, the Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World, signed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the Prime Minister of India in November 1986. It formulates the principles for a world of a new quality and guaranteed solidity, a world free from violence in nuclear or any other form. Nor is this a speculative project but a platform for concrete action by all countries, a platform prompted by concern for the future of humanity and every single human being who attach primary importance to planetary values.

The Declaration calls for the complete destruction of nuclear arsenals before the end of the century, the prevention of the militarisation of outer space, a ban on all nuclear weapons tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles, a lowering of the levels of conventional arms and armed forces. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and India propose that an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be concluded immediately. This would become a major concrete step towards complete nuclear disarmament.

The Delhi Declaration, backed by the prestige of the highest political leaders of the two great powers, is seen everywhere as the prototype of the nuclear-free world to come, a world resting on a solid system of comprehensive security equal for all.

The UN and Universal Security

The United Nations has lately been gaining in significance as a mechanism regulating the security system. It has already done a good deal to mould both a thinking and a mode of action consonant with the nuclear and space era and to defeat extremely dangerous ideas about the admissibility of war and armed conflict. The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and other declarations of the UN General Assembly, the decisions of the first and second special sessions on disarmament, UN research into various aspects of international security play, now as in the past, a positive role in the effort to ease tensions and put international relations on a healthier basis. Even so, the present-day international situation demands further vigorous efforts by nations and specific steps in every sphere of international relations towards building a really positive world based on a reliable, comprehensive international security system and not merely on the absence of war. The UN must both play its role in forming such a security system in a safe, nuclear-free world and become its most important guarantor.

The proposal for establishing a comprehensive international security system was submitted by the Soviet Union and a group of other socialist countries to the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly (1986). They are of the opinion that the UN should work out a fundamental document setting out the basic principles of establishing a comprehensive international security system and serving the UN as a guide in its effort towards providing the system with material, political, legal, moral and psychological guarantees.

The socialist countries' proposal offered a starting point for, and imparted a definite trend to, the broad debate which took place at the session and was prompted by a search for ways to a safe world. The majority of countries showed a great interest in that collective search for paths to security for all. The socialist countries which raised this question to bring about a democratic discussion in the UN on the substance of the security problem and mobilise the collective wisdom of the organisation's members for its solution achieved their purpose.

UN quarters noted the sincere desire of the socialist countries to induce all countries to join in the debate as widely as possible, and to openly pose and discuss various problems. There was also real proof of a readiness to bear in mind the considerations of other participants in the debate, the only criterion being the need to arrive at greater mutual understanding and strengthen security.

The socialist countries' joint initiative also infused fresh spirit into the form of holding debates in the United Nations. Under its impact controversy and confrontational rhetoric visibly gave way to substantive discussion on baffling aspects of contemporary world politics. All

this was seen in the UN as further evidence of a new approach to international affairs, of the unity of words and deeds in carrying on a policy in harmony with the new political thinking.

The socialist countries advanced the idea that the problem of security is not limited to the military sphere. It was perceived by UN members as a new and important aspect of the approach proposed by these countries. A relevant decision of the UN stated outright that the task is all-inclusive and bears on interconnected areas of disarmament, the settlement of crises and conflicts, economic development and cooperation, and the encouragement and defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

This refuted the allegation of Western opponents of disarmament that the Soviet Union and its allies wanted to impose the concept of eliminating nuclear and other weapons without regard to the complexity and interconnection of all the other problems of today's world. The General Assembly backed, in effect, the view that efforts to achieve security should be made on all lines simultaneously rather than being blocked by barren arguments over which should be achieved first—disarmament or confidence.

Every step towards establishing a comprehensive security system and bringing about a nuclear-free world would lead to the replacement of the immoral balance of nuclear terror which the U.S. and NATO militarists have imposed and which they now extol as all but the only factor for curbing war. The new security system would leave no room for planning Star Wars or pursuing a neoglobalist policy. The influence of large social forces and the mass of the people would grow, as it is actually doing now. It is only natural, therefore, that the initiative of the socialist countries found ready support among most of the non-aligned countries, which hailed its trend towards democratising international relations.

On the other hand, there was again a shortage of new political thinking on the part of the governments of a number of influential capitalist countries, primarily the U.S. administration. In spite of the obvious fact that the socialist countries' collective initiative is not directed against any country or group of countries and that its purpose is to invite a free expression and comparison of views in order to ascertain and extend areas of agreement in the interest of all, the delegations of the United States and some of its allies took a stand against the proposal, revealing as they did so the usual "logic" of confrontation, which considers that whatever comes from the "other camp" is bad.

In reality the proposal of the socialist countries poses for the first time ever a historic task, doing it in a comprehensive and generalised form: rising above differences and narrow interests and beginning to act as partners in

order to defend and advance civilisation. This necessitates a truly revolutionary remoulding of political consciousness. There is a need to evolve a universally acceptable political language that could be used for reaching agreement on the most complicated issues effectively and in a civilized fashion and could replace the language of guns for all time.

However, it goes without saying that tasks of such magnitude and significance cannot be accomplished with one stroke or at one forum, by the efforts of one or two groups of countries. They require persevering, painstaking and purposive effort. There can be no easy success in the exceedingly complicated matter of reshaping political thinking and psychology and existing notions of force as the mainstay of security. But there is no reasonable alternative to a search by all countries for common ground and closer positions.

Complete realisation of the proposals for a comprehensive security system would make it possible for all countries of the world—socialist or capitalist, developed or developing, large or small—to stop feeling threatened. There would simply be no more threat to their security, and the "balance of terror" would give way to the only real balance, the balance of reason, confidence and goodwill.

Thus, the socialist countries propose a manifesto of the new political thinking. Its purpose is to raise our civilisation to a qualitatively new level of development. The way to do this is to build a better future by the efforts and in the interest of all. Of course, the *new thinking* is not a nonce amendment of attitude but a *methodology of conducting international affairs*. This is why the socialist countries do not regard the security principles proposed by them as something immutable. The new political thinking is incompatible with canons or myths. To represent any pattern, no matter how complete or perfect, as infallible is to tell a myth.

A wide discussion on the issue of a comprehensive international security system in the United Nations, at multilateral and bilateral level, should serve as a school for mutual understanding and cooperation, which are so very scarce in the world. We would like all countries to take a creative part at the 42nd Session of the General Assembly in a continued dialogue on a comprehensive international security system, to state their views on this wide range of problems on a democratic and non-confrontational basis.

The General Assembly could call on all countries and all international inter-governmental and public organisations to examine the problems facing them from the standpoint of the need to guarantee the survival of humanity. The UN Secretary-General could be asked to do research into the problem of comprehensive security with the aid of a team of experts and submit a report on the findings to the 42nd Session of the General Assembly.

The socialist countries lay no claim to possessing the ultimate truth in this matter. They are convinced of the need to take account of the opinions of all countries, and so they favour a continuation and extension of fruitful discussions on every aspect of comprehensive security at all levels. The aim of the dialogue they propose is to work out by joint efforts specific measures intended to provide material, political legal, moral and psychological guarantees of peace, to find the shortest road to the actual provision of equal security for all.

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Deputy Chief of Staff Urges Strict Compliance With ABM Treaty

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[Article by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Colonel General Vladimir Lobov: "The ABM Treaty: Apprehensions and Hopes"]

[Text] It is 15 years since the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems—the instrument of unlimited duration—entered into force on 3 October 1972. It became the groundwork for the process of limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. During all these years the ABM Treaty has been an effective barrier in checking the race in strategic offensive arms and the initial precondition for talks on their elimination.

The unfading significance of the ABM Treaty is accounted for by the fact that there is a close interrelationship between offensive and defensive arms in general, and especially strategic ones. The development of defences is inevitably followed by qualitative and quantitative changes in offensive weapons. The buildup of strategic offensive arms can be checked, stopped and reversed only if the strictest limitations are imposed on all ABM systems and their components. This is precisely the purpose of the ABM Treaty. It stabilises the military-political situation and stimulates the elimination of strategic offensive arms.

Aware of the most significant role the ABM Treaty has for achieving nuclear disarmament and strengthening international security, the world public marks the 15th anniversary of this instrument both with hope and apprehension. With hope because time has demonstrated beyond doubt the vitality of the ABM Treaty and the need to preserve it. With apprehension because the U.S. administration is manoeuvring around the treaty. In violation of Article VI of the treaty the United States has deployed an early-warning radiolocation station in Thule (Greenland) and began the construction of a

similar station in Britain. The treaty can be undermined by the intention of the United States to take arms into outer space, to deploy a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements.

During the Soviet-American talks in the 1970s the sides discussed a number of major disarmament and security problems. At that time the groundwork for detente was being laid. Considering the greater danger of strategic offensive arms, the sides concentrated from the start on reaching an understanding on their limitation. But these weapons were not isolated from others, and their evolution was clearly reflected in the work then started to build anti-ballistic missile systems.

Designers were at a crossroads—in what direction and how to develop ballistic missiles and how to ensure a breakthrough in the ABM defence of the potential enemy? The sides at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-1) found themselves at the crossroads, too. It was becoming obvious that no limitation of strategic offensive weapons could be effected so long as the ABM systems were developed. So practice itself prompted the need to elaborate an agreement limiting strategic defence systems. The Soviet and American delegations recognised this and gave priority to elaborating such an agreement. All this enabled them to sign two major and interrelated accords: the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

In the Joint Soviet-U.S. Communiqué the sides stated on 30 May 1972, that both documents "constitute a major step towards curbing and ultimately ending the arms race," that they correspond "to the vital interests of the Soviet and American peoples as well as to the vital interests of all other peoples." In the Preamble to the ABM Treaty the sides stressed that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."

Time has confirmed the correctness of that conclusion. The 15 years that elapsed since the ABM Treaty entered into force have shown that the interrelationship between defensive and offensive weapons exists objectively, no matter what technical level their development has reached. With parity in strategic offensive arms the building of an additional defence potential by either side would be tantamount to gaining unilateral advantages in offensive arms. This would inevitably cause a response by the other side, and so a new round of the arms race, unpredictable in scope, would be provoked.

The ABM Treaty, of uncompromising and unlimited-duration nature, is designed to prevent such a dangerous development of the military strategic situation in the world. All provisions of that document, its every article, envisage measures to limit ABM systems and their

components as well as R&D in this sphere, so that they will never—now and in future—stimulate the development of offensive strategic arms.

In this sense Article I of the treaty is of key significance. It says: "Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense." The same purpose is expressed in Article V prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of sea-, air-, space-, or mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. Considering that the treaty is of unlimited duration, all its provisions apply, naturally, to the existing and future ABM systems, no matter what physical principles their components are based on.

The above-mentioned articles are the core of the treaty, for they formulate the principle of limitation: ABM systems may be only land-based, cover a definite small area, and be only fixed. In the USSR the ABM system is deployed in the area of Moscow; and in the United States, on the territory of the Grand Forks missile base, both areas are limited in size, in the number and composition of weapons and equipment, and for that reason, in keeping with the treaty, cannot serve as the basis for a territorial system of nation-wide defence.

So the ABM Treaty was, and remains, a barrier in the way of building a large-scale ABM system and is a necessary condition for abolishing strategic offensive arms.

The U.S. administration, ignoring the realities of the nuclear and space age, sticks to its course of achieving military superiority over the USSR. As it failed to achieve this on the path of the nuclear arms race on Earth, the pentagon intends to take it into outer space to try to gain advantages for itself there. But the ABM Treaty stands in the way of these vicious plans whose purpose, briefly speaking, is to build an integrated offensive-defensive strategic potential enabling the United States to use nuclear weapons as a decisive argument in its foreign policy.

To conceal from public opinion what is really behind these plans, they were named Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI champions allege that the building of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements, which is being developed under this programme, is aimed ultimately at eliminating nuclear weapons. U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, advertising SDI in a report to the Congress, was trying to prove that the SDI research would facilitate the quest for verifiable reductions of offensive arms at nuclear arms limitation talks.

There is a serious flaw in his reasoning, which reduces to naught all arguments offered by SDI champions to date. The point is that the United States is not only speeding up the implementation of the SDI programme but is building up strategic offensive arms at a high pace.

Even if we assume that Washington, while getting ready for deploying a large-scale ABM system, sincerely intends to eliminate nuclear arms, then how is it going to account for the fact that the United States is planning to build a qualitatively new offensive strategic potential by the early 1990s? As is seen from the annual report by the U.S. Secretary of Defense to the Congress, Washington is going to deploy new MX and Midgetman ICBMs and Trident-2 SLBMs and the new B-1B heavy bombers. It has been planned to introduce new Navstar systems, which are expected to greatly increase the accuracy of a missile strike. Besides, the United States is going to replace half of its nuclear munitions with more up-to-date ones by 1990. Long-range cruise missiles of any basing, viewed by U.S. experts as complementary for the nuclear first strike potential, are being speedily deployed. Those who are developing these missiles in the United States believe they can be the only weapon capable of completing the first nuclear strike at Soviet launchers, which would be pinned down by the earth raised by nuclear explosions.

The facts cited here give us every reason to assert that the Space Shield being forged by the SDI fathers, is designed for increasing the U.S. offensive potential, for enabling it to deliver a first nuclear strike with impunity, in hopes of protecting the United States from retaliation. Besides, the components of a large-scale space-based ABM system are universal. They can appear over the territory of any country and, acting practically instantly, complete offensive tasks, hitting targets at a long range in space, in the air, and on the land.

While it proclaims its readiness to free the world of nuclear arms, in practice Washington is conducting nuclear war preparations. The main principles of building and using U.S. nuclear forces are expressed in Directive 32 signed by the President in May 1982. According to that directive, the first use of nuclear arms by the United States is considered quite natural. Furthermore, this directive also sets tasks like preparedness for waging an effective war from outer space, development of space strike weapons, and speeding up building of an ABM system.

However absurd all this may sound today, Washington still stakes on the possibility of winning a nuclear war and on using nuclear arms as an instrument of foreign policy. Significant in this context is a statement by well-informed former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who warned in October 1986: "Most Americans—and, I believe, most Japanese—are simply unaware that Western strategy calls for early initiation of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviets. Eighty percent of Americans believe we would not use such weapons unless the Soviets used them first. They would be shocked to learn they are mistaken. And they would be horrified to be told that senior military commanders themselves believe that to carry out our present strategy would lead to the destruction of our society."

In other words, while declaring its readiness to destroy nuclear arms with the help of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements, Washington is speedily building its first-strike potential, and the nationwide ABM system is going to be one of its elements. A large-scale ABM system would be a supplement to the nuclear first-strike offensive forces, but in no way would it be opposed to them. One complements the other, and taken together, these two directions of the arms race stimulate each other. Their integration sharply increases the risk of a nuclear war, aggravates crisis situations, and leads to greater world tensions. Therefore the U.S. actions to hamstringing the ABM Treaty, interpreting its provisions so that it would not restrict the testing of space-based ABM components, should be regarded as an attempt to upset the existing military-strategic parity.

Adherence to the ABM Treaty is a crucial factor in restricting the race not only in strategic, but also in other arms. The building of large-scale ABM defence with space-based elements is by far not the only goal set by SDI advocates. It resembles the tip of an iceberg whose greater part is hidden from view under water.

The point is that the SDI project includes the more perspective aspects in the development of most advanced technologies for military purposes, which can increase many times over (and are already increasing) the combat efficiency of weapons. Significant in this context are the revelations made by Wood of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, one of the main SDI architects, who pointed out during a discussion, sponsored by the Heritage Foundation, that, in contrast to the early 1970s, when the building of an ABM system in the United States was just contemplated, progress has been achieved in laser, computer, communications, sensor and other technologies which simply did not exist 12 years ago.

The work on building a large-scale ABM system under way in the United States is an entirely new stage in the military technological revolution, whose results can be used not only for developing space strike weapons and combat control systems, but also for increasing the power of nuclear and conventional arms many times over and placing military confrontation on a basically new and more dangerous level. Therefore some Western researchers have every reason to believe that SDI, which in itself is a result of an unjustified belief that security can be ensured by military technology and the use of weapons, may give an unprecedented impetus to the development of new generations of weapon systems.

The idea of building an SDI system, as far as concerns the United States's real aims, reflects Washington's intention to launch a new round of the arms race by using the most advanced technologies and facilities. As Mikhail Gorbachev stressed, "new military programmes are being launched, but they present a far greater threat of a world war than at that time (in the early 1960s—V.L.), because this is taking place at a new scientific and

technological level of the arms race, when there exists a far greater arsenal of weapons capable of destroying civilisation within a few days."

Attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR have been made before. Throughout postwar history the U.S. ruling elite banked on developing a super weapon guaranteeing them a rapid and effective victory in aggression against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. As a result, the arms race was constantly stepped up in qualitative terms in a bid to gain military-technological superiority over the Soviet Union, which could then be transformed into military-strategic superiority. Today, too, the U.S. military-political leadership believes that military superiority over the USSR cannot be achieved without a forestalling buildup of the research and technological potential. It is most important, said the U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, that the United States carry into effect an active scientific and technological programme to maintain or increase U.S. technological superiority over the USSR. In the U.S. ruling quarters the stake on the technological arms race is so apparent that the choice of this direction is not even questioned. In his report to the Congress on the 1988 fiscal year Caspar Weinberger pointed out, that one of the greatest advantages the United States possessed in its long-term competition with the Soviets was the quality and productivity of its technology base. And further on, "our research and development expenditures are of critical importance to us because they represent our investment in future military capabilities."

So, the "purely research" character of the work conducted in the SDI framework clearly coincides with Washington's plans to escalate the qualitative arms race, and fits into the broader strategy of gaining military technological superiority over the USSR. This is not a chance coincidence, of course. It is a carefully calculated policy whose ultimate aim is to upset the military strategic parity at all levels, from nuclear to conventional arms, and to return to U.S. imperialism its "position of strength" in international relations. It would be dangerous to underestimate this most aggressive aspect of the SDI programme.

It is hard to foresee today precisely what purpose will serve the results of the work on the SDI programme in various areas of military activity and how negative the aftermath will be for the international climate. But at this point it is safe to say that they can give a most powerful impetus to every aspect of the arms race.

In this situation the significance of the 1972 ABM Treaty increases still more. The strengthening of its regime would largely help to curb the arms race and block quite a few of its directions. Both political and psychological aspects of this problem are equally important. The preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty would tie the hands of those in the U.S. military-political elite who have come out to steer the arms race into outer space, making it uncontrollable.

For all appearances, the stabilising effect of the ABM Treaty on the international situation runs counter to the aggressive policy pursued by the U.S. administration, and does not meet the interests of the military-industrial complex patronised by it. Using defence assurances as a disguise, and seeking loopholes into space for SDI components through a so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Washington does not stop short casting aspersions on the other signatory, accusing it of imaginary violations of the commitments assumed under the treaty. Such tricks are alarming—isn't the United States going to reject this document when this suits it?

The Soviet Union displays a diametrically opposite attitude to the ABM Treaty. As it stands up consistently for curbing the arms race, the USSR strictly observes the commitments assumed under the treaty, and works persistently for its preservation and strengthening. Its efforts to that effect are fully in keeping with new thinking in foreign and domestic policies and the approach to war and peace issues in the nuclear and space age. The Soviet Union does not seek superiority over other countries and is not going to deploy arms in outer space; nor is it building a large-scale ABM system. It has offered an alternative to all this by suggesting that an understanding be reached on large reductions of strategic offensive arms, with all provisions of the ABM Treaty being strictly observed.

The preservation of this most important treaty meets the aspirations of the whole world community, which expects the USSR and the United States to make substantial progress towards eliminating strategic weapons. It would be no exaggeration to say that the ABM Treaty has been most instrumental for achieving the military-strategic parity between the two nuclear powers. It could largely facilitate positive developments today, too, above all in achieving progress at the talks on nuclear and space weapons. Therefore, we are for preserving the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration signed in 1972, for its being in force and without a time limit.

The Soviet Union is not just for preserving this most important instrument, but for strengthening its regime. It is opposed to misinterpreting its provisions in a self-serving manner as is being done by the SDI champions in the United States. In its practical deeds the USSR proceeds from the fact that no state has the right to interpret international documents as it suits it.

The strict approach of the Soviet Union to the inadmissibility of a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty is also backed up by many politicians in the United States, including the absolute majority of those who took part in wording this document. The head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT-I talks, Gerald Smith, said that a broad interpretation of the treaty by the U.S. administration is tantamount to violating it. Six former U.S. secretaries of defense spoke against its broad interpretation. In a letter to the President and to Congress written in March 1987, Robert McNamara, Clark Clifford, Melvin Laird, Elliot

Richardson, James Schlesinger and Harold Brown stressed that the United States should adhere to the traditional interpretation of the treaty banning the development and testing of an air-, sea- or space-based ABM system. This is the only approach that can protect the core of the ABM Treaty from being eroded and prevent an arms race in space.

This problem is given the greater prominence at the U.S.-Soviet Talks on Nuclear and Space Weapons in Geneva, proceeding from the formula of the Soviet-American summit at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union believes both sides should oblige themselves not to use the right of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty within the next decade, strictly abide by all its provisions, and during that time to eliminate all strategic nuclear arms. Two or 3 years before this term expires, the sides meet to elaborate a mutually acceptable decision on what to do next.

The Soviet leadership, displaying state wisdom and political courage, has untiringly sought, and is seeking now, ways of reaching an equitable agreement to ensure complete international security for all. Neither the Soviet Union, nor other Warsaw Treaty countries have ever associated their future with a military way of solving international problems. The main goal of their activity, which was stressed again in the document Warsaw Treaty Military Doctrine—for Defence of Peace and Socialism they adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, is to eliminate war for ever, to stop the arms race, rule out the use of military force, safeguard peace and security, and effect general and complete disarmament.

These are the goals of the Soviet Union in its struggle for strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty. Seeking a way of reaching a mutually acceptable understanding on this issue, it delinked the IRBMs problem from the Reykjavik package without linking it to the treaty.

The USSR has proposed that key provisions on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive arms be elaborated and an understanding be reached in principle on strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty on the basis of the formula proposed at Reykjavik and on holding full-scale negotiations with the United States on banning all nuclear tests. Together with the signing of a treaty on IRBMs and enhanced-range tactical missiles they could be the object of an understanding at the summit level and serve as a basis on which legally binding Soviet-American accords could rest. To facilitate agreement on the key provisions, in particular, as applied to the ABM Treaty, the USSR agreed that the research in the sphere of space-based ABM systems be allowed at the laboratory level, that is on the earth—in research institutes, on testing grounds and at manufacturing works, without taking ABM components to outer space. The Soviet side has said, it is prepared to agree on the list of devices that may or may not be placed in outer space.

The Soviet Union is doing all it can to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration. But it would be wrong to proceed from the conjecture, as is done in the West, that our compromise moves with regard to understandings on strengthening the regime of the treaty are dictated by the threats to realise the SDI. It should be made absolutely clear that the USSR is not a state with which one can talk in a language of diktat. This was stressed by Mikhail Gorbachev at the press conference in Reykjavik: "In any case we do not fear SDI. I say this confidently, for to bluff in such matters would be irresponsible. There will be an answer to SDI. It may be asymmetrical, but it will be. And we shall not have to sacrifice much for this."

At the same time, the Soviet Union sees a danger in the United States's going ahead with building a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements for it involves the world in a new stage of the arms race, destabilises the strategic situation and will undermine the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

The treaty was considered by the sides twice—in 1977 and in 1982. And each time the Soviet Union and the United States confirmed their adherence to its goals and recognised its effectiveness and vitality. The third (regular) joint consideration of the treaty is scheduled for the autumn of this year. The Soviet Union believes that in the future as well the treaty can and must serve as a substantial factor of lessening the danger of nuclear war. Our position is as follows: so long as no arms are deployed in space, the opportunity exists for preventing the arms race in that sphere through mutually acceptable and equitable agreements between the USSR and the United States. That is why at the Geneva talks the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty on a 50 percent reduction of strategic arms and a draft agreement on strengthening the regime of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. These drafts are compromises which take into account the positions of the other side and meet its interests half way. Now it is the United States's turn to move.

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APN Chief Falin Appeals to FRG on Short-Range Missiles

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[Excerpt] Saarbruecken (DPA)—Valentin Falin, editor-in-chief of the NOVOSTI news agency, has appealed to the Federal Republic not to make Gorbachev's reform program more difficult through a policy of arms escalation and modernization of short-range missiles. In a broadcast on Saarland Radio on Saturday, the Soviet expert on Germany said: "Stepping up rearmament and modernizing existing weapons would force the two sides into a fresh arms race. For us this would mean spending more resources on the military race and fewer resources on peaceful perestroika." Falin appealed to the outside world, including the Federal Republic: "Won't you please give us the chance to conduct our affairs systematically and in peace. Please don't force us to do anything."

Falin, who was ambassador to Bonn for a number of years, described the Federal Republic's stance on modernizing short-range missiles following the INF accord on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles as less consistent than it should be. "This inconsistency—on the one hand something positive is done and on the other something negative—creates major difficulties in the political sphere and above all makes efforts for the establishment of trust between states very difficult and very protracted." He stressed that the Federal Republic plays a key role in Europe and East-West relations in general. "For that reason an improved climate in Europe is not possible without the basic agreement of the Federal Republic." Without the Federal Republic, the INF treaty would not have come about. [passage omitted]

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO's Carrington on Impact of INF Treaty *13231602 Madrid YA in Spanish 14 Feb 88 p 4-5*

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington by Juan Vicente Boo; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] Brussels—[Boo] Does Spain's NATO membership mean a significant improvement in allied security? What are Spain's major contributions?

[Carrington] Spain's entry obviously increases allied security, both politically and militarily. Politically, Spain's membership is a clear demonstration of the growing strength, stability, and solidarity of our western democracies. Militarily, Spain's geostrategic position and the addition of its Armed Forces to those of the alliance constitute a really significant contribution. The Spanish Government has proposed to the alliance several roles that the Spanish Armed Forces could perform.

[Boo] Some say that NATO's basic strategy is obsolete and needs updating. Could this renewal be achieved at the summit of allied heads of government on 2-3 March?

[Carrington] First of all, I want to emphasize my complete disagreement with this assertion, and I believe recent events show I am right. Our flexible response strategy is still valid. The same applies to the basic elements of our security approach, which are the maintenance of adequate defense while at the same time actively seeking balanced and verifiable accords with the Warsaw Pact countries. The past 40 years of peace show this approach is not obsolete and that it would be highly irresponsible to abandon it before we are sure it can be replaced by something better. Furthermore, I believe the Soviets also agree with me on the validity of our approach. I am sure the history of the INF negotiations and our determination to deploy the missiles in the absence of an accord convinced the Kremlin leaders we have a strategy and viewpoints on security that they must definitely take very seriously. However, we must of course constantly calculate how to satisfy our strategic needs within a changing political, economic, and military context. The NATO summit in March will provide an important opportunity to this end.

[Boo] Are real changes occurring in the Soviet Union? Has the Soviet threat in Europe diminished?

[Carrington] I believe the answer to your first question is definitely affirmative. Considerable efforts are being made, primarily with a view to making the Soviet system and economy function more efficiently. Gorbachev himself, however, has said it could be several years before his plans for economic change, not to mention political reform, show any results. His program is encountering resistance in several sectors, from the workers through the bureaucrats and high-level politicians. There is no reason for us to be any less cautious than he is in our

assessment. We must not behave as though the changes and reforms had been carried out and proved to be a success. Be that as it may, we must closely follow the entire process and stimulate changes wherever we can. After all, we have been urging changes in the Soviet Union for years. Therefore, we can only welcome them.

[Boo] Do these changes extend to foreign policy as well?

[Carrington] In foreign policy, there is more continuity than change. The stockpiling of weapons continues. Hitherto there have been no signs of glasnost within the CSCE, where we are trying to improve East-West contacts in several fields. We must therefore be patient and cautious. We must base our decisions not only on words but on whether these words become deeds. The touchstone will be the new conventional arms control negotiations and specifically the Soviets' agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate their superiority in this field.

[Boo] How great is the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority?

[Carrington] I believe it is right to say—and most studies agree—that the Warsaw Pact enjoys an approximate 2 to 1 superiority over NATO in most aspects. Allow me to give you an example. In the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals the Warsaw Pact has some 50,000 battle tanks, whereas we have approximately 20,000. There is a similar advantage in the case of artillery. Furthermore the Warsaw Pact's structure, organization, and deployment strengthen these imbalances. In the final analysis, the significance of the superiority will of course depend on the timing and circumstances of the conflict and on a number of factors such as the training, morale, and quality of men and equipment, which are very difficult factors to assess.

[Boo] What are the trends in Soviet military spending?

[Carrington] Recent analyses indicate an increase in Soviet military spending. Their expenditure on materiel seems to be increasing at a rate of 3-4 percent a year, whereas ours is remaining stable or decreasing. We should therefore make better use of the available resources. In December, the foreign ministers approved a system of planning for conventional weapons designed precisely to step up cooperation and prevent the wastage of resources in unnecessary duplication of research, development, and supply.

[Boo] The torrent of Soviet disarmament proposals (the North European security zone, the nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe, and so forth) is promoting discussions among the allies. Are these discussions a good or a bad thing for alliance cohesion?

[Carrington] We do not need the Soviet proposals you mention in order to conduct a useful and stimulating discussion among the allies on various aspects of disarmament and arms control. Do not forget that all the

progress now being witnessed in this field is based on our proposals and initiatives. The zero option on INF was one of our proposals. Another is the proposal of a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear forces. In the negotiations on chemical weapons we have for years been proposing a total but adequately verifiable ban. In Vienna the allies have requested the opening of new negotiations to improve stability in this field too. In all these negotiations our efforts are based on a very complex process of consultations among the allies. Allow me to mention an example to illustrate this. Over the past 3 years of the INF negotiations the allies met at a high level over 50 times in Brussels to discuss how to proceed. On other issues too the consultations process in recent years has been more intensive than ever before in the alliance's history. Of course, we have differences of opinion from time to time. However, I regard this not as a weakness but as something natural. Nevertheless during my 4 years as secretary general I have been impressed by our ability to formulate shared stances and to adhere to them.

[Boo] Has there not been a change in the Soviet attitude?

[Carrington] You mentioned various Soviet initiatives. In practice several of them have never been followed up in any negotiating forum. My conclusion is that their intention was not to promote arms control but, rather, to exploit what the Soviets perceive as differences of opinion within the alliance. Be that as it may, I would like to add this: The allies never automatically reject any of these proposals. We always study them to see whether they contain elements that could be useful. Do not misunderstand me, however. Recently the Soviets have cooperated much more than before. The INF treaty would have been impossible without the changes that have taken place in the Soviet negotiating approach. Nevertheless you must not forget that the result owes much more to our proposals and our determination.

[Boo] What is the foreseeable agenda for arms control talks? Does a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear missiles have any practical advantage for Europe?

[Carrington] This point was discussed in detail by the NATO foreign ministers in Reykjavik in June and again in Brussels in December. The agreed agenda is ambitious and far-reaching. The first objective is to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons by half. Furthermore we want to eliminate all chemical weapons and to establish a balance of conventional forces by reducing the Soviet superiority in several categories. Last, jointly with the banning of chemical weapons and the establishment of a balance of conventional weapons, we want to achieve considerable and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based short-range missiles to the same levels. Of course the 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons which I mentioned before is not desired only by the United States and the USSR. It is important to the Europeans, too. Not only will the situation improve at a lower level of nuclear weapons but there will be a smaller

likelihood of the Soviets' violating the INF treaty by redirecting strategic weapons toward European targets hitherto marked by the SS-20's.

[Boo] What are the main advantages of the INF treaty as far as Europe is concerned?

[Carrington] I am resolutely convinced that the INF treaty improves security of the alliance and therefore of Europe. It eliminates over 800 accurate and mobile Soviet missiles, most of them equipped with multiple warheads. It eliminates a particularly disturbing threat to our cities and our defense. The treaty envisages very asymmetrical reductions in which the Soviets are eliminating 3-4 times as many missiles and warheads as the United States. Of course, this reflects the fact that the USSR had a large superiority in this class of weapons. The treaty also establishes unprecedented strict verification systems, including in situ inspections at very short notice. Last, by eliminating an entire class of American and Soviet nuclear weapons, the treaty demonstrates the viability of much more ambitious approaches to arms control.

[Boo] Are there no dangers, apart from these advantages?

[Carrington] As far as dangers are concerned, I believe that the main problem is the tendency to perceive more than there are. We must maintain the correct perspective. Obviously, we are not at the end of the road but at the start of a long process. We must now step up our efforts in other areas of negotiation to exploit the principles established in the INF Treaty. Furthermore, let us not forget that arms control alone does not guarantee our security. There are important factors of which we must not lose sight: The Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional and chemical weapons has not been eliminated. On the contrary, the Soviets are continuing the modernization of their forces, both nuclear and conventional. This means that, in parallel with arms control negotiations, we must do everything necessary to maintain an adequate and credible defense. Otherwise, not only will our security suffer, but our capacity to negotiate balanced arms control agreements will be reduced.

[Boo] What are the consequences of the INF treaty with regard to the allied strategy for Europe?

[Carrington] NATO's military commanders have assured me that they can continue to perform their tasks following the implementation of the INF treaty. They are satisfied that our flexible response strategy will remain effective and credible. However, we must of course continue to ensure that our forces, both nuclear and conventional, maintain their credibility. We must continue with our existing plans—which were formulated some years ago and which have not been affected by the INF treaty—and do whatever is needed to maintain effective and modern forces.

NATO Official Opposes Banning Short-Range Missiles

02251645 Paris AFP in English 1636 GMT 25 Feb 88

[Text] Brussels, Feb 25 (AFP)—General Wolfgang Altenburg, chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's military committee, said Thursday that he opposed dismantling short-range nuclear weapons. In an interview with AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Gen. Altenburg said it would be unwise to accept a Soviet proposal to scrap short-range tactical nuclear missiles with ranges of under 500 kilometres (300 miles) to achieve the so-called triple-zero option.

The double-zero option is the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,000 kilometres (300 to 3,000 miles) as agreed under the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty signed in Washington in December.

Gen. Altenburg said negotiations on conventional forces and short-range tactical nuclear weapons had to be "seen in conjunction" with "the timing priority clearly given to the conventional side."

NATO claims that Warsaw Pact conventional forces vastly outnumber the conventional forces of the Western alliance. He said NATO would welcome a 50 per cent reduction in intercontinental nuclear missiles with ranges of more than 5,000 kilometres (3,000 miles).

He said the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to be moving towards such a deal in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, adding that this would complement the INF treaty.

Another NATO priority would be to eliminate chemical weapons, Gen. Altenburg said, adding that it would be difficult to verify compliance with a ban on chemical weapons.

The military chiefs of 14 of NATO's 16 member countries sit on NATO's military committee. France, although a NATO member, does not form part of the Western alliance's integrated military command, and Iceland has no Army.

Gen. Altenburg, 59, interviewed at NATO's headquarters here, declared with more than a hint of pride: "I am Prussian," but emphasized that he was speaking for NATO and not as a West German officer.

Excerpts from the interview:

AFP: Is the triple-zero option a good thing from a military stand point?

Gen. Altenburg: No. A third zero at the moment from a military point of view in short-range nuclear forces [SNF] is not a wise move. For a third zero many factors have to be considered: the factor of the conventional disparity but also the need of nuclear weapons to deter and to restore deterrence.

AFP: How much has NATO done to modernize its nuclear weapons?

General Altenburg: The modernization program of NATO's nuclear capabilities was decided after long work programs in Montebello (Canada) in 1983. As this already shows, that is an old running program which actually has nothing to do with the INF treaty (upon the destruction of all missiles having a range from 500 to 5,500 km).

This program included a lot of things ... I must say that up to now quite a lot of those things have been completed already. And on some we are still working—this is actually nothing special.

It has been dramatised after the INF treaty in a way which does injustice to the program itself. And another thing, it is entirely wrong to just focus it on one system, like for instance the follow-on to Lance (a tactical nuclear missile with a range of 120 kilometres (75 miles)). This is also something which will in due time come under discussion.

AFP: When will the 88 Lance launchers now deployed in western Germany and in Turkey become obsolete?

Gen. Altenburg: They would become obsolete sometime in the 1990's. Then of course you have the problem of nuclear weapons below 500 km. As we know, here we have net superiority of the Soviet Union in launcher systems—Lance versus the Scud, Frog and SS 21—that has to be cleared up. To determine where this should be negotiated is a political decision still to be made.

AFP: As a military chief do you think there are obvious links between conventional and nuclear aspects of that disparity?

Gen. Altenburg: I am glad that the foreign ministers of the alliance have decided in Reykjavik (in June 1987) that the conventional disparity and SNF have to be seen in conjunction. The military agrees to this very well, with of course the timing priority clearly given to the conventional side.

AFP: In your opinion, does it make sense to negotiate both problems together?

Gen. Altenburg: It has to be seen in context but time-wise the priority has to be on the conventional side. Because only after you know how well you come in control of the conventional disparity can you decide just how to proceed with SNF.

Thatcher 'Isolated' Over USSR Nuclear Threat

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1802 GMT 2 Mar 88

[By Geoff Meade and Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION, in Brussels]

[Text] Mrs Thatcher isolated herself from other NATO leaders tonight with a tough declaration that the Soviet nuclear threat was real and growing.

At the two-day NATO summit in Brussels aimed at giving full support to President Reagan's forthcoming arms reduction talks in Moscow, she called on the West to modernise its nuclear forces and attacked Soviet defence and foreign policies.

Earlier in the day both President Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Kohl of West Germany had strived to play down the dispute within NATO over nuclear modernisation.

But Mrs Thatcher refused to tone down her stance that modernisation must go ahead.

"We must distinguish between rhetoric and reality," she told the NATO leaders.

"There is no evidence of a slowing up of Soviet modernisation in conventional and nuclear weapons since Mr Gorbachev took office."

Soviet military programmes were still shaped by the doctrine that a major war against NATO could be fought, survived and won.

The Soviet Union was striving for a de-nuclearised Europe so that it could exploit its conventional and nuclear superiorities to "intimidate and overawe" some nations.

Mrs Thatcher's commitment to the modernisation of NATO's nuclear arsenal has cast a shadow over the summit and emphasised deep policy divisions.

She gave the other 15 NATO leaders examples of Soviet modernisation.

—By 1995 almost all the Soviet strategic forces in place in the mid-1980s will have been replaced by new modern systems.

—A new Soviet submarine is deployed every 37 days.

—650 top-line fourth-generation fighters have been introduced over the past five years.

—More than 90 space launchers were built last year for military purposes.

"With Soviet modernisation programmes, both conventional and nuclear, proceeding at full steam, there is no reason to be backward in acknowledging our own determination to modernise nuclear forces," she said.

"An obsolescent deterrent is no deterrent."

Nuclear weapons would always be necessary. "We must keep them up to date and effective," she added.

No country was prepared to send its troops into the field without adequate protection from nuclear weapons.

"If our defence policy is to remain credible we must ensure our forces everywhere are provided with adequate nuclear protection," she explained.

No specific decision on modernisation—an area where Britain is at odds with Bonn and President Mitterrand—are expected from the summit which ends tomorrow.

But Mrs Thatcher made clear it was the responsibility of NATO's leaders to give clear guidance on modernisation to defence and foreign ministers. Rapid decisions were needed to improve nuclear capabilities and the West had to maintain a technological superiority as that, in itself, was a deterrent.

Words were not enough. "It's about taking decision to ensure effective deterrents," she said.

"We must be prepared to do that; otherwise words will lack substance."

She said there was no case for further reductions in the West's nuclear arsenals until agreement had been reached with the Soviets on chemical and conventional arms control.

Despite her criticism of Soviet policies, she welcomed the reforms Mr Gorbachev was seeking and stressed he deserved the West's support for his "courageous" reform policies.

Earlier at the summit NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington gave clear backing to Mrs Thatcher's hard line on nuclear weapons when he stressed the Alliance could not "rest on its laurels."

He said: "One agreement which reduces some weapons and, indeed, one new Soviet leader who is ready to reduce some tensions, however significant, do not in themselves remove the military capability and potential of the Soviet Union."

NATO's Carrington Supports Thatcher on Arms
08021457 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English
1226 GMT 2 Mar 88

[By Geoff Meade and Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION, in Brussels]

[Text] NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington today gave clear backing to Mrs Thatcher's warning that the Soviet threat to the West is still a reality. Speaking at the opening of the two-day NATO summit in Brussels, designed to give full support to President Reagan's forthcoming arms reduction talks in Moscow, Lord Carrington stressed the alliance would not "rest on its laurels." "One agreement which reduces some weapons and, indeed, one new Soviet leader who is ready to reduce some tensions, however significant, do not in themselves remove the military capability and potential of the Soviet Union," he said.

Only last month the prime minister used a visit to NATO as the platform for condemning Soviet foreign policy which she said was dedicated to getting rid of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. She warned NATO that, despite the new Soviet policy of glasnost, to be on guard against the USSR's continued determination to drive a wedge between the member countries. [sentence as received]

Mrs Thatcher's commitment to the modernisation of NATO's nuclear arsenal—as a vital part of meeting the Warsaw Pact threat—has cast a shadow over the summit and emphasised deep policy divisions. President Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany have agreed to shelve the modernisation question until NATO develops a comprehensive strategy for both nuclear and conventional disarmaments.

There is strong support within Germany for the removal of all short-range weapons as these, if fired, would detonate on West or East German soil. Even French President Francois Mitterrand has added his voice although France is not a member of NATO. He stressed over the weekend there was no urgency to agree to modernisation, arguing European security would be better served by continuing disarmament.

But today, as Mrs Thatcher joined the other 15 leaders, Lord Carrington echoed Mrs Thatcher's concern. However he stopped short of any clear proposal on the modernisation of nuclear weapons, particularly short-range—the issue which has caused a rift between London and Bonn. He said NATO was now looking forward to more serious discussions with the Warsaw Pact on the central problem facing European security from the imbalances in conventional and chemical weapons. "A verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains high on our agenda," he said.

Lord Carrington said the INF treaty to remove all medium range nuclear missiles from Europe was just the first stage of a long road. "But the alliance has made a splendid beginning," he added.

It is expected that at the end of the summit the member nations will present a united front in their determination to face the Soviet threat. Officials are still facing problems drawing up a final communique stating NATO policy to be issued at the end of the meeting.

[Text] Despite concern expressed in recent weeks by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl about nuclear weapon modernisation, the opening remarks to the summit contained nothing to upset the British camp. British sources emphasised specific weapon systems would not be discussed. However, what was described as "the spirit of modernisation" will be there. But sources explained no decisions were needed on modernisation for at least a year, if not two.

"The aim of the summit is the demonstration of the essential unity of the alliance which will arm President Reagan with the additional negotiating power unity gives when he goes to Moscow later in the spring," said one British source. "This is a political conference, a public relations conference to demonstrate to the Western and Eastern worlds the unity of the alliance." This, it was stressed, was Mrs Thatcher's purpose for attending the summit.

FRG Press Comments on Brussels NATO Summit

17031111 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 3 Mar 88

[From the press review]

[Text] The FRG press today highlights the Western defense alliance's summit meeting in Brussels.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: The chiefs of state and government of the 16 NATO countries are meeting above all to face the alliance and themselves. They will congratulate themselves on the fact that the alliance is in agreement and has therefore been able to reach a historic accord with the Soviet Union—the treaty on intermediate-range disarmament—and they will give the U.S. President a dignified farewell. Reagan will emphasize U.S. solidarity with West Europe. Mrs Thatcher will confirm her claim to a leading role in the alliance. President Mitterrand is demonstrating by his presence France's new proximity to NATO. And Federal Chancellor Kohl will give himself credit for having succeeded in asserting German interests.

NATO is still a long way from an overall disarmament concept as urged, in particular, by the Federal Government. It would be desirable for NATO to be able to respond to Gorbachev's initiatives by submitting well-considered counterproposals. However, that is not the

case. To the end of Reagan's term of office, Washington will be busy with U.S.-Soviet negotiations. London confirms its support for the doctrine of flexible response, but President Mitterrand has just expressed doubts about the Western strategy and suggested reconsidering it in essence. Politicians in Bonn are even satisfied if the coalition parties are able to reach agreement. The summit is not the place to resolve differences; for that, patient and quiet diplomacy is necessary, stresses FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE.

The daily DIE WELT says: The NATO meeting that was opened in Brussels yesterday with big words and high expectations has been overdue since the confusing nightmarish summit of Reykjavik. Misunderstandings and doubts had to be resolved that affected the essence and substance of the Alliance's defense strategy. Ronald Reagan has removed that confusion and has made a firm and clear statement about the U.S. role in this alliance. The fact that he committed himself not to change anything about the presence of U.S. troops in Europe is reassuring for the moment. But his claim to speak on behalf of future presidents in that respect is bold. The word about sharing burdens in the alliance, which we hear in the United States with growing intensity, can and should not be ignored in Europe, writes DIE WELT.

The Konstanz publication SUEDEKURIER comments as follows: It is absolutely necessary for NATO to agree on a common line prior to the next meeting between Ronald Reagan and the Soviet Communist Party leader. Otherwise it will run the risk of being divided by new Kremlin diplomatic moves. It seems that NATO has been able to agree on individual areas. Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn agree that given the Soviet Union's conventional superiority, NATO could not totally renounce nuclear weapons, and that it was therefore too early to consider a third zero solution for short-range systems. However, that is not enough for a negotiating philosophy, says SUEDEKURIER.

SCHWARZWAELDER BOTE, published in Oberndorf, writes: Ronald Reagan, who wants to go down in history as a peace president, started long ago considering things beyond NATO's interests. He has a major policy agreement of the two nuclear giants, the United States and the Soviet Union, in mind. So Moscow is giving the Brussels meeting a lot of food for thought. One thing is certain—nothing will be done there that could harm the next summit with Gorbachev.

Both superpowers are working hard on further disarmament negotiations. However, for all the basic approval by the respective alliance partners in East and West, there is a certain uneasiness. West Europe's security interests will be an issue that the United States' partners on this continent will primarily be dealing with in the future, thinks SCHWARZWAELDER BOTE.

ITALY

Agreement With USSR for Inspection of Comiso 52002439 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 30 Dec 87 p 10

[Text] Rome. As of yesterday the Washington treaty on Euromissiles has also become an operational treaty between the USSR and Italy. Once the treaty between the superpowers is ratified and operational Soviet inspectors will be able to land at the Rome airport (Ciampino) on very short notice and from there proceed to Comiso on board Italian military aircraft to check compliance with the deadlines granted by the two superpowers for the withdrawal and dismantling of the cruise missiles installed at the Sicilian base. This is the first time that an agreement, providing for the reciprocal opening of military bases to observers in uniform from the 2 countries, has been signed between Italy and the USSR. The exchange of diplomatic notes took place yesterday afternoon in the Foreign Ministry between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti and the Soviet ambassador to Italy Nikolai Lunkov.

After a brief ceremony Andreotti commented that "this is another concrete contribution from the Italian government to its continual commitment to the total elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles; an accord which represents a change in international relations." The head of Italian diplomacy added that the Washington agreement "represents a change in international relations and hopefully marks the beginning of a reversal in the accumulation of mass destruction weapons which has accompanied the postwar period." Andreotti continued to say, in essence, that the two superpowers will have to negotiate an agreement on strategic weapons and space weapons. The Soviet Union must also be convinced of the advantages of conventional disarmament.

A similar exchange of diplomatic notes has already taken place between the USSR and the British and Dutch governments, and is planned for the governments of the other two Western countries having Cruise and Pershing II missiles, Belgium and West Germany. On 11 December the five countries had already signed an accord in Brussels together with the United States concerning the procedures and methods of the inspections called for in the Soviet-American accord of 8 December. The agreement signed by the Italian government on 11 December and the exchange of diplomatic notes which took place yesterday with the Soviet Union will be subjected to ratifications by Parliament and will become effective only after the American and Soviet ratifications of the treaty concerning the intermediate nuclear forces. As for Italy, the inspection schedule which is to remain in force for a period of 14 years will only involve the Comiso base. There is to be an initial inspection to ensure the accuracy of the deployment data, then other inspections will follow to ensure compliance with the total elimination of the Cruise missiles which is to occur within three years of the effective date of the accord of 8 December.

During the 10 years thereafter the Soviets will still be able to make inspections on very short notice. A 24-hour liaison center will be set up in Italy for the notification of inspections and the corresponding compliances within the limited times allowed. The "entry point" of Soviet inspectors arriving in Italy will be Ciampino whence they will proceed on to Comiso accompanied by Italian representatives who are to stay with them during their inspection tours. The list of inspectors—who will be granted privileges and diplomatic immunity—will first have to be submitted to the Italian authorities who are also to be informed of the outcome of the inspections, similarly to the procedures concerning the inspections called for by the European Disarmament Conference held in Stockholm.

In addition to the five allied countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, the inspection set up also includes Czechoslovakia and East Germany, where the Soviet SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles are deployed. Upon applying his signature, Andreotti, while expressing his own satisfaction, declared that, "by readily adhering to the inspection agreements the Italian government is expressing the will of a very large majority of the political forces represented in Parliament, which voted in favor of the Agreement of 8 December in the hopes of a quick entry in force. We feel confident that the arms control agreement will provide an additional impetus for progress in the East/West dialogue in all its aspects, and will increase the sense of responsibility of everyone for finding a solution to the most destabilizing crisis."

"The year 1987," continued Andreotti, "closes with this positive note, which is the result of long and persevering work carried out over more than 7 years. Once again I wish to express the hope that the Soviet government will find suitable solutions for the many points still being discussed in the same spirit of openness shown in the negotiations on intermediate nuclear weapons."

In a short speech at the time of the signing, the Soviet ambassador Lunkov remarked that "3 or 4 years ago, today's ceremony for the exchange of diplomatic notes for verifying dismantling at the Comiso base would have

been impossible and even unthinkable, another fact which demonstrates once again the importance of the moment we are experiencing."

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TURKEY

Commentary Reports USSR Reaction To Nuclear Arms In Turkey

35540039z Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
10 Nov 87 p 9

[Excerpt]

Nuclear Weapons

The number of nuclear systems and nuclear warheads presently in Turkey does not bother Moscow at all. Officials of the Soviet Defense Ministry made this very clear to us. They consider those now on our soil as "defense oriented."

However, the thing that bothers them and what they have started pressuring Ankara about is the NATO nuclear modernization program. They do not think Turkey will be able to offer much resistance to this program. To protect their own interests, they are sending Ankara the message, "Don't take the new nuclear system. You'll ruin relations."

Actually, they are saying, "Don't take anything," but are paying careful attention to which new system Turkey will receive. Will it be Lance-2's or missiles to mount on F-16's?

Turkey will get nowhere if it listens completely to the Soviets on this matter and attempts to act accordingly. It is in our interest, at this stage of revising our nuclear policy, to pay attention to our relations with the Soviets (even in today's generally softening atmosphere). However, we must not overdo it unnecessarily, either.

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